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ARTICLE
Joshua Kastenberg
The Right to an Independent Judiciary and the Avoidance
of Constitutional Conflict: The Burger Court’s Flawed
Reasoning in Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit
and Its Unfortunate Legacy
Abstract. In 1970, the United States Supreme Court issued Chandler v.
Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit in which five Justices determined that the
federal courts of appeals possessed an administrative authority to manage the
district court judges within an appellate court’s respective circuit. The decision
enabled the Tenth Circuit to decide the fitness of a judge to preside over cases
without a formal motion from a litigant. Although Congress had enabled the
courts of appeals to oversee basic judicial functions (such as temporarily
assigning district court judges to overworked districts), Congress did not intend
to grant the power to remove the judicial duties of a district court judge; such
an act could equate to a judicial impeachment by the Judicial Branch. The
Justices who dissented in Chandler, Hugo Black and William O. Douglas, argued
that the Court had taken a substantial step in undermining the independence of
the Nation’s federal trial judges. Although Congress has since statutorily
reduced the impact of Chandler, it remains a flawed influence on the
investigation and potential disciplining of the Nation’s federal judges. This
Article examines the underlying causes and impact of Chandler, and suggests an
argument for curtailing the decision’s impact by limiting it to purely
administrative matters.
Author. Joshua Kastenberg is a professor at the University of New Mexico
School of Law. Prior to joining the faculty there, he served over two decades
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in the United States Air Force as a judge advocate, including the last five as a
military trial judge.
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When the Article III judiciary is called upon to police itself after receiving
allegations of judicial malfeasance, or a judge’s inability to advance cases, the
courts of appeals will investigate through a process which involves an
administrative institution known as a judicial council.1 The investigation
operates much like an administrative proceeding, but it is largely closeted
from the public and—with only one minor step—there is a lack of a
meaningful standard of proof employed throughout.2 The process has
improved since its inception, but it remains flawed—subjecting federal
judges (other than Supreme Court Justices) to a process which does not
mirror the standards United States courts employ in cases and hearings.3 In
essence, the structure which exists today for internal judicial investigations
can be used to undermine the independence of individual trial judges.4 This
flawed process was shaped by Chief Justice Warren Burger in Chandler v.
Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit (Chandler II).5
Issued on June 1, 1970, the Supreme Court recognized in Chandler II that
the eleven judicial councils possessed the administrative authority to remove
district court judges from individual cases and from sitting on trials for
specified periods of time without first requiring a litigant’s appeal.6 This
decision essentially meant that an appellate court could—on its own and
without articulating a defined standard of proof—remove a district court
judge without first requiring a litigant to appeal through a writ of mandamus
or prohibition.7

1. See Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the U.S. (Chandler II), 398 U.S. 74, 76
n.1 (1970) (“Each judicial council shall make all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious
administration of the business of the courts within its circuit.” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 332)).
2. Infra Part I–II.
3. Infra Part II–III.
4. Infra Part III–IV.
5. Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the U.S. (Chandler II), 398 U.S. 74 (1970).
At the time of Chandler II, there were eleven circuit courts of appeals including the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See Thomas E. Baker, A Legislative History of the Creation of the
Eleventh Circuit, 8 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 363, 363 (1992) (emphasizing the creation of the “new eleventh
circuit” occurred in 1981). This new circuit, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, was created
from the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, § 5, 94 Stat. 1994, 1994.
6. See Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 86 n.7 (“We find nothing in the legislative history [of 28 U.S.C.
§ 332] to suggest that the Judicial Council was intended to be anything other than an administrative
body functioning in a very limited area in a narrow sense as a ‘board of directors’ for the circuit.”).
7. Id. at 91–94 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court’s action had the effect of rejecting the
appellant’s claim of a right to obtain relief without further proceedings in a lower tribunal.”).
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Created in 1939, a judicial council is a statutory mechanism that
authorizes each federal appeals court to administratively manage the federal
district courts within the circuit.8 Contemporaneous with the Supreme
Court’s review in Chief Justice Warren Burger in Chandler v. Judicial Council of
the Tenth Circuit (Chandler I)9 and Chandler II, a number of congressmen,
including Emanuel Celler (the Chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee), concluded that because the Constitution vests Congress with
the sole authority to remove federal judges through the impeachment
process, the action of appellate court judges in removing a district judge
from trials through an administrative, rather than appellate, process
threatened the independence of the Nation’s federal trial judges.10 In
principle, Congressman Celler’s Committee determined that the
administrative removal of a trial judge constituted an end run around both
the Legislative Branch’s power and the rights of litigants to contest the
removal.11 In fact, more than one legislator argued that the existence of
such an administrative process was a blatant unconstitutional extension of
judicial power.12 Although the Supreme Court infrequently cites to

8. See id. at 76 n.1 (majority opinion) (discussing a judicial council’s role in making “necessary
orders for the effective and expeditious administration . . . within its circuit”).
9. Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the U.S. (Chandler I), 382 U.S. 1003
(1966).
10. Cf. Letter from Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Comm., to Sam Ervin,
U.S. Senator (Jan. 26, 1966) (on file with the Library of Congress) (“I am watching developments [of
Chandler] with a careful eye. I am not unaware of the far-reaching implications in this unprecedented
matter.”).
11. See Lee R. West, Biographical Sketch for the Historical Society of the Tenth Circuit on
Judge Stephen S. Chandler, Jr., TENTH CIR. HIST. SOC’Y, at 13, https://static1.squarespace.com/
static/54170cd0e4b00eba52a2db00/t/54516653e4b09c9c97c0b22b/1414620755682/Chandler_bio.p
df [perma.cc/ND5V-3NMS] (emphasizing the House Judiciary Committee’s findings after
investigating Judge Chandler’s behavior, and urging that “[i]f any of the judges should be removed
because they are unfit to discharge their responsibilities, the only mechanism provided by the
Constitution, impeachment, is not available” (citation omitted)).
12. See Judicial Fitness: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach. of the Comm. on
the Judiciary U.S. S., 89th Cong., pt. I, at 5 (1966) [hereinafter U.S. S. Judicial Fitness Hearings] (statement
of Sen. Sam J. Ervin, Jr., as presented by Sen. Joseph D. Tydings, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on
Improvements in Judicial Mach.) (“The action of the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit in dismissing
Judge Chandler was unwarranted and precipitous, and I agree completely with Justices Black and
Douglas that the Supreme Court should have stayed the Order.”); Letter from Emanuel Celler to Sam
Ervin, supra note 10 (expounding the Supreme Court’s action in Chandler was over-reaching and
inappropriate). Further, it is evident some legislators still had faith in a different approach. In 1966,
Congressman Harold Royce Gross introduced House Resolution 739 “to inquire into and investigate
the official conduct” of Judge Chandler. H.R. Res. 739, 89th Cong. (1966) (enacted).
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Chandler II,13 the decision serves as an important marker in relations
between the legislative and judicial branches—not only influencing judicial
relationships between trial and appellate courts, but also shaping judicial
ethics.14
The majority’s decision is brief, and without reading Justice John Harlan’s
lengthy concurrence or Justice William O. Douglas’s dissent, it might appear
that the Court casually determined that no constitutional impediment
existed in the administrative removal of federal trial judges.15 Likewise, the
majority’s decision is sterilized from any discussion of the constitutional—
if not ethical—implications for the extra-legislative removal and discipline
of judges.16 As a result, one might infer that Chandler II presents legal
scholars, not only a study on how Chief Justice Burger led the majority of
Justices to avoid a significant constitutional issue and remove judicial ethics
considerations from a decision rife with questions in both categories, but—
because Chief Justice Burger also ignored congressional determinations
which, if followed, could have reasonably led the Court to issue a ruling
inapposite of Chandler II—the decision also presents a study in legislative
and judicial relations.
Although, normally the judiciary should immunize itself from political
considerations, in this particular instance, it is noteworthy that in 1939
Congress created the judicial councils by passing the Administrative Office
Act;17 and, between 1965 and 1969, the House Judiciary Committee
determined that the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit violated that
Act.18 Additionally, Congressman Celler—a long-serving congressman and

13. Only eight Supreme Court cases appear to use Chandler II as a citing reference. Search of
U.S. Supreme Court Cases Citing Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the U.S., WESTLAW,
https://next.westlaw.com (locate Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the U.S., 398 U.S. 74
(1970); click the “Citing References” tab; select the “Cases” option; select the “Federal” option; then
choose “Supreme Court” under the “Jurisdiction” category).
14. Cf. Carl L. Shipley, Legislative Control of Judicial Behavior, 35 DUKE L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
178, 179–87 (1970) (defining constitutional issues within the Chandler opinion that are fundamental to
our Nation’s foundation).
15. See generally Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 74–89 (failing to find a constitutional impediment existed
in the Judicial Council’s actions).
16. Id.
17. Administrative Office Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-299, 53 Stat. 1223.
18. See John P. MacKenzie, House Probe Reports Judge Lost Seat Unfairly, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Dec. 19, 1969, at 12-A (“A secret House Judiciary Committee report has concluded that the Tenth U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals went beyond the law and the Constitution when it stripped Oklahoma Federal
Judge Stephen S. Chandler of his judicial duties in 1965.”).
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member of the House Judiciary Committee—assisted in the Act’s
creation.19
Chandler II has never been analyzed as a legal history, and particularly not
so in terms of the jurisdictional positions and motives of the participants,
including an ad hoc panel of the House Judiciary Committee that
investigated Judge Chandler as well as two other judges involved in the
Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit’s actions.20 That House Committee
panel (headed by Congressman Jack Brooks, a Texas Democrat, William
St. Onge, a Connecticut Democrat, and Nathan Poff, a Virginia Republican)
determined that the Judicial Council had acted beyond its statutory and
constitutional powers in its supervision of Judge Chandler.21 From the time
of its issuance to the present, Chandler II has occasionally been discussed,
but there are no articles or books which analyze the interplay between
Congress and the Supreme Court in regard to the issues leading to the
decision. No studies citing to Chandler II analyze how Judge Chandler’s
conduct and personality (as well as that of Judge Alfred P. Murrah, Judge
Chandler’s opponent on the Tenth Circuit) affected the Court’s decisional
processes. Yet, Judge Chandler’s conduct—both on and off the bench—is
a reasonable part of the decision’s analysis, in part because newspapers
ranging from the Daily Oklahoman to the New York Times reported on
Judge Chandler, making his conduct notorious to the public.22 In addition,
the Justices deciding Chandler II were also well aware of Judge Chandler’s
conduct; Justice Hugo Black attended the Tenth Circuit Judicial Council’s
conference in 1961 and 1964 and was hosted by Judge Chandler during

19. Cf. Peter Graham Fish, The Circuit Councils: Rusty Hinges of Federal Judicial Administration, 37 U.
CHI. L. REV. 203, 206 (1970) (discussing Congressman Celler’s involvement in the hearing, regarding
the 1939 Act); Shipley, supra note 14, at 189 (establishing Congressman Celler was Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee in 1970, and portraying him as a contender in the early effort to address
the regulation of judicial behavior).
20. See Shipley, supra note 14, at 178–80 (discussing a few of the participants in the storm
ultimately leading to the Chandler II opinion).
21. See Fish, supra note 19, at 232, 240–41 (analyzing the Judicial Council’s overreach in its
supervision of Judge Chandler).
22. See U.S. Judge Stephen Chandler, 89; Often Feuded with His Colleagues, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1989,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1989/04/29/obituaries/us-judge-stephen-chandler-89-oftenfeuded-with-his-colleagues.html [perma.cc/F94Z-MZD7] (“Twice [Judge Chandler] was removed
from hearing lawsuits because of allegations of personal interest or bias and prejudice.”); accord
Katherine Hatch, Judge’s Role in Two Cases Under Attack, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Aug. 19, 1965, at 1
(covering one of Judge Chandler’s controversies).
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both.23 In light of Judge Chandler’s well-known exploits, one could
presume the Court’s avoidance of examining the significant underlying
issues resulted in a poorly constructed decision.
This Article is divided into four sections. The first details the conduct of
Judge Chandler and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals that lead to the
issuance of the Council’s Order barring Judge Chandler from serving on
trials. This section also presents an analysis underlying the purpose for the
creation of judicial councils. Because the Act creating the judicial councils
had never been challenged in the courts, Judge Chandler’s appeal presented
a case of first impression when it came before the Supreme Court.24
The second section of this Article analyzes the legislative branch’s
investigation into Judge Chandler and the Tenth Circuit Judicial Council, as
well as the opinions of several legislators who did not take a role in the
investigation, but did serve on one of Congress’ two judiciary committees
and opposed both the Council’s actions and the Supreme Court’s rulings.
Importantly, not only did the House Judiciary Committee conclude that the
Judicial Council had unconstitutionally exercised a non-existent authority,
three prominent legislators—including a senator on the Senate Judiciary
Committee—also criticized the Council’s actions.
The third section of this Article details the Supreme Court’s deliberative
findings through the personal correspondences of the Justices involved in
the decision, as well as the various drafts of the Chandler I and Chandler II
majority and dissenting opinions.
The fourth section provides an analysis on how the Court’s majority
created an unintended consequence in rendering its decision in Chandler II,
and does so by examining how the judiciary has made use of it. This Article
concludes with a suggested applicability guideline for the use of Chandler II
in future decisions arising from challenges to judicial supervision actions and
judicial rule-making.

23. See Letter from Hugo Black, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Stephen Chandler, Chief Judge,
U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Okla. (June 29, 1961) (on file with the Library of Congress)
(commenting favorably on the meeting).
24. See generally Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 75–76 (addressing the “scope and constitutionality of the
powers of the Judicial Councils under 28 U.S.C. §§ 137 and 332[,]” and proclaiming the issues as
questions of first impression).
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I. JUDGE CHANDLER, THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT,
AND OKLAHOMA
In 1929, Congress formed the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit to
alleviate a growing appellate docket in the Eighth and Seventh Circuits.25
Then, the Tenth Circuit was composed of the United States Districts for
Wyoming, Utah, Oklahoma, Kansas, Colorado, and New Mexico.26 In
1906, Congress divided the State of Oklahoma into two Territories,
establishing the start of Oklahoma’s Eastern and Western Districts.27
Congress created a third district in 1925, titled the United States District for
the Northern District of Oklahoma.28 In its early history, the Eastern and
Western Districts shared a judgeship. For instance, Judge Alfred Murrah
and Judge Bower Slack Broaddus served as district judges in both districts.29
Judge Chandler was appointed exclusively to the Western District in 1943,
and he served on the bench until he took senior status in 1975.30 The Senate
confirmed him by a close vote of thirty-seven to twenty-eight, with
thirty-one senators not voting.31 In 1956, as a result of judicial retirements
and deaths, Judge Chandler became the Chief Judge of Oklahoma’s Western

25. See Arthur J. Stanley, Jr. & Irma S. Russell, The Political and Administrative History of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 66 DENV. L.J. 119, 122 (1982) (indicating the “creation of the
Tenth Circuit in 1929 was actually the second time a ‘Tenth Circuit’” was created by the judicial system).
26. See Act of Feb. 28, 1929, Pub. L. No. 70-840, ch. 363, 45 Stat. 1346, 1347 (“[T]he [T]enth
[C]ircuit shall include the districts of Colorado, Wyoming, Utah, Kansas, Oklahoma, and New
Mexico”); CHARLES L. ZELDEN, THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: PEOPLE,
PROCESSES, AND POLITICS xxvii (2007) (“This act divided the Eighth Circuit into two circuits,
organizing the judicial districts of Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming as
the Tenth Circuit.”).
27. See Act of June 16, 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-234, ch. 3335, § 2, 34 Stat. 267, 268 (enabling the
Indian Territory and the Territory of Oklahoma).
28. See Act to Amend Section 101 of the Judicial Code, Pub. L. No. 68-418, ch. 233, § 101,
43 Stat. 945, 945 (1925) (“The State of Oklahoma is divided into three judicial districts, to be known
as the northern, the eastern, and the western districts of Oklahoma.”).
29. See Murrah, Alfred Paul, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/murrahalfred-paul [https://perma.cc/JTC6-YFPB] (indicating Judge Murrah concurrently occupied a seat in
the Western, Eastern, and Northern Districts of Oklahoma); see also Broaddus, Bower Slack, FED. JUD.
CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/broaddus-bower-slack [https://perma.cc/M2ZC-R5P4]
(reporting Judge Broaddus replaced Judge Murrah, sitting concurrently in the Western, Eastern, and
Northern Districts of Oklahoma).
30. See Chandler, Stephen Sanders, Jr., FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/
judges/chandler-stephen-sanders-jr. [https://perma.cc/XFT6-KAAP] (indicating Judge Chandler
served in the Western District from 1943 until 1975).
31. See West, supra note 11, at 3 (“[Judge] Chandler’s nomination was finally confirmed in May
of 1943, by the rather narrow margin of 37 yeas and 28 nays, with 31 not voting.”).
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District.32 In 1965 the other judges in the district included Judge Luther
Bohanon, Judge Ross Rizley, Judge Alvin Daugherty, and Judge Luther
Burbank.33 Judge Bohanon, who was a long-time friend of Judge Murrah,
clashed with Judge Chandler.34
A. Judge Chandler’s Public and Private Conduct
Judge Chandler was a contentious judge. In 1981, Judge A. Leon
Higginbotham, of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, called
Judge Chandler “cantankerous to the extreme and in all probability mentally
ill.”35 Judge Julius Hoffman on the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois was Judge Chandler’s closest judicial
acquaintance on a federal court, and the two men appear to have had a
similar demeanor—characterized by angry outbursts at counsel and
witnesses.36 When Judge Hoffman became well-known for his role in the
politicized trials of the so-called “Chicago Seven” in 1969, Judge Chandler
lauded his treatment of that trial’s defense counsel.37 In 1965, Oklahoma’s
newspaper readers were greeted with front-page news detailing
Judge Chandler’s various controversies with a local district attorney.38 On
his death in 1988, the New York Times reported, “Stephen S. Chandler, a
32. See id. at 4 (“[Judge] Chandler was appointed chief justice of the district in 1956, and
assumed greater administrative duties.”).
33. See U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma: Judges, FED.
JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/u.s.-district-court-western-district-oklahoma-judges
[https://perma.cc/S67U-TNBN] (listing the judges who have served the Western District of
Oklahoma and the years in which they served).
34. See West, supra note 11, at 4 (“[The feud] began to positively boil once Murrah’s long-time
friend, Luther Bohanon, was appointed judge for the Western District of Oklahoma in 1961.”).
35. Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 639 F.2d 972, 987 (3d Cir. 1981) (Higginbotham, J., concurring).
The author wishes to note that because Judge Chandler was still alive, this characterization was not
only unseemly and unfair to Judge Chandler, but there was no evidence of Judge Chandler suffering
from a diagnosed mental illness. Judge Chandler may have been mentally ill, but he may have also
been irascible.
36. Cf. Letter from Stephen Chandler, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Okla.,
to Julius Hoffman, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Ill. (1970) (on file with the Library of
Congress) (“All real Americans should be deeply grateful to you. We need more like you.”).
37. Cf. Letter from Julius Hoffman, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Ill., to Stephen
Chandler, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Okla. (Sept. 10, 1970) (on file with the
Library of Congress) (“Here is my long delayed expression of appreciation for the kind and generous
message you sent to me . . . .”). There was much public notoriety of this trial in which Judge Hoffman
held the defense counsel in contempt. See Eric A. Posner, Political Trials in Domestic & International Law,
55 DUKE L.J. 75, 121 (2005) (“The judge in the Chicago 8 case jailed many of the defendants and their
lawyers for contempt . . . .”).
38. Hatch, supra note 22.
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federal judge who often feuded with other judges and lawyers, died at a
hospital here early Thursday.”39 In 1962, Judge Chandler testified that
other judges had treated him spitefully, that his telephone had been tapped,
and that he was afraid of being poisoned.40 On April 21, 1962, the Daily
Oklahoman headlined its front page: “U.S. Appeals Court Bars
Judge Chandler from Oil Firm Case[,]” and on a following page:
“Reprimand Jolts Judge Chandler[.]”41
In early 1964, Judge Chandler published an article in the American Bar
Association Journal42 that served notice to the courts of appeals that the
Nation’s federal trial judges were in constant danger of having their
independence usurped through the administrative acts of the appellate
judges.43 Judge Chandler expressed a particular concern regarding the
appellate courts’ use of judicial councils.44 He may have presciently known
that he would soon become enmeshed in a dispute with the Judicial Council
of the Tenth Circuit and sought to create a preemptive legal defense, but the
record seems silent on this matter.45 Interestingly, the personal collections
of Senators Samuel Ervin (a North Carolina Democrat) and James Eastland
(a Mississippi Democrat) contain Judge Chandler’s article, and the
senators—who both served on the Senate Judiciary Committee—later sided
with Judge Chandler in the dispute against the Council.46

39. U.S. Judge Stephen Chandler, 89; Often Feuded with His Colleagues, supra note 22.
40. Cf. West, supra note 11, at 1 (“Chandler was certain that his enemies employed agents to spy
upon him, tapped his phones, surveilled his house, and stood at the ready to poison his water carafe
or even strap a bomb beneath the hood of his long white Cadillac convertible.”).
41. See U.S. Appeals Court Bars Judge Chandler from Oil Firm Case, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Apr. 21,
1962, at 1.
42. Stephen S. Chandler, The Role of the Trial Judge in the Anglo-American Legal System, 50 A.B.A. J.
125 (1964).
43. Id. at 129 (“The judicial reform movement is tending too far in the direction of
subordinating the administrative authority of the trial judge.”).
44. See id. at 129–30 (“The inestimable benefits of a judicial system handled by trial judges who
are answerable to no man, and under no control other than that of their own consciences, could well
be lost by a change calculated to create the feeling on the part of the judge that he was just another
employee taking orders from a judicial council acting as a quasi[-]board of directors.” (citation
omitted)).
45. Cf. id. at 125 (“It is time to suggest, nevertheless, that [judicial reform] organizations [like
the Senate Judiciary Committee] have . . . completely overlooked the negative effect on the more
important fundamental principles as well as the psychological factors that exist in the judicial process.”).
46. See Nominations of Abe Fortas & Homer Thornberry: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary
U.S. S., 90th Cong. 2 (1968) [hereinafter Nominations of Fortas & Thornberry Hearing] (listing James
Eastland and Senator Sam Ervin as members of the Committee on the Judiciary).
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Judge Chandler was born in Tennessee in 1899.47 He graduated from
Kansas University’s law school in 1922 and entered into private practice in
Oklahoma.48 In 1940, President Franklin Roosevelt, on the advice of
Senator Elmer Thomas, nominated Judge Chandler for a federal
judgeship.49 It took the Senate three years to hold a vote, and, as noted,
Judge Chandler was confirmed by bare majority.50 Yet, Judge Chandler had
powerful friends in Congress; Senator Robert Kerr, a long-serving
Oklahoman legislator and ally of Lyndon Johnson, had been one of his
confidants.51
In 1974, journalist Joseph C. Goulden published The Benchwarmers, a study
of federal district court judges, including Judge Chandler.52 Although one
could examine newspaper reports to piece together aspects of
Judge Chandler’s life (and there is a brief biographical sketch written for the
Tenth Circuit Historical Society53), one would likely agree that Goulden’s
book provides a vivid account of Judge Chandler’s legacy. According to
Goulden, over the course of his career, Judge Chandler accused
Judge Murrah and Judge Bohanon of conspiring to force him off the
47. See West, supra note 11, at 2 (“Stephen Chandler was born on September 13, 1899 in Blount
County, Tennessee, in the shadow of the Great Smokey Mountains.”).
48. See id. (“After earning his law degree at the University of Kansas in 1922, [Judge] Chandler
spent 21 years in private practice before being tapped . . . for one of Oklahoma’s three district court
vacancies.”).
49. See Chandler, Stephen Sanders, Jr., supra note 30 (showing President F. Roosevelt nominated
Judge Chandler on February 1, 1943); see also West, supra note 11, at 2 (noting Senator Elmer Thomas
tapped Judge Chandler for a court vacancy).
50. See West, supra note 11, at 2–3 (noting Judge Chandler’s nomination was “proposed” to the
U.S. Department of Justice in 1940, but that he was not confirmed until 1943).
51. See, e.g., Letter from Burl Hays, Admin. Assistant, Senator Robert S. Kerr, to Stephen
Chandler, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for West Dist. of Okla. (on file with the Library of Congress)
(showing the close relationship between Senator Kerr and Judge Chandler through Kerr’s assistant’s
letter to Judge Chandler stating his desire “to always be able to come by and smoke one of
[Judge Chandler’s] good cigars and enjoy [Judge Chandler’s] company”).
52. See generally JOSEPH C. GOULDEN, THE BENCHWARMERS (Weybright & Talley 1974)
[hereinafter THE BENCHWARMERS] (discussing reigns of several prominent U.S. judges). This book
was not without its critics. For instance, one critic argued that the book concentrated on a small
number of federal judges to the detriment of the Judiciary as a whole. See, e.g., James G. France, Review
of “The Benchwarmers,” By Joseph C. Goulden, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 262, 265 (1975) (book review) (“Here
the work is, perversely, at its readable best, although admittedly it does not paint a true picture of the
bulk of the federal judiciary.”).
53. Lee R. West, Biographical Sketch for the Historical Society of the Tenth Circuit on
Judge Stephen S. Chandler, Jr., TENTH CIR. HIST. SOC’Y, https://static1.squarespace.com/
static/54170cd0e4b00eba52a2db00/t/54516653e4b09c9c97c0b22b/1414620755682/Chandler_bio.p
df [perma.cc/ND5V-3NMS].
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court.54 But there was also a seamy aspect to Judge Chandler’s conduct.
He made bad investments in real estate which caused him to fall into debt.55
He named the particular bank to which he was most indebted the trustee in
a multi-million-dollar investment corporation’s bankruptcy action, which
happened to be pending in his court.56 This raised many questions
surrounding Judge Chandler’s judicial status.57
Centering on three particular instances of Judge Chandler’s conduct in
order to highlight questions as to his judicial fitness, temperament, and
impartiality, it is important to note that Goulden had interviewed
Judge Chandler, and that he did not portray him as being unethical in the
same manner that he depicted other judges in his book.58 The first instance
had to do with Judge Chandler’s handling of the bankruptcy of Selected
Investments.59 In 1960, Patrick O’Bryan, a tax attorney retained by
Selected, successfully contested an IRS judgment.60 In an appeal to the
Tenth Circuit, O’Bryan argued that several banks (and notably the very bank
where Judge Chandler had property loans) were responsible for Selected’s
loss of revenue and legal difficulties.61 Judge Chandler had, in fact, invested
heavily in his daughter’s land development project—a tract of homes
outside of Oklahoma City called Smiling Hills—and was in debt to the bank
for thousands of dollars.62 O’Bryan used this point in his arguments.63
But O’Bryan also had personal difficulties with Judge Chandler. During
O’Bryan’s representation of Selected, he billed the company over
one-million dollars in attorneys’ fees.64 To prove he was entitled to the
fees, he provided Judge Chandler with a contract purported to have been
drafted by Selected.65 In 1961, Judge Chandler discovered discrepancies in
54. THE BENCHWARMERS, supra note 52, at 212–13.
55. Id. at 208.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 209.
58. See generally id. (garnering several judges in the book as unethical, but failing to name
Judge Chandler amongst them). In spite of this, Goulden did not turn a blind eye to Judge Chandler’s
more risqué tendencies. See France, supra note 52 (“The second chapter . . . records a stirring account
of the judicial career of the Honorable Stephen S. Chandler . . . . No phase of the judge’s activities, if
derogatory, is left untouched.”).
59. THE BENCHWARMERS, supra note 52, at 216.
60. Id. at 217.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 220.
63. Id. at 217–18.
64. Id. at 221.
65. Id.
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the letter-head of the contract and barred O’Bryan from practice in the
federal courts.66 O’Bryan did not initially deny fabricating the letter, and
Judge Chandler tried to pressure the United States Attorney into
prosecuting O’Bryan for perjury.67 When the Justice Department
determined there was insufficient evidence to seek an indictment,
Judge Chandler, on his own volition, secured an indictment against O’Bryan
in a standing grand jury.68 During a pretrial hearing in which O’Bryan
moved the court to quash the indictment, the United States Attorney opined
to the trial court that Judge Chandler had departed from his judicial duties
and pressured the grand jury to indict.69 In response, Judge Chandler
threatened to hold the United States Attorney in contempt.70 Judge
Daugherty—one of Judge Chandler’s peers—sided with the United States
Attorney and dismissed the indictment without prejudice to the
government, thereby enabling the government to seek a new indictment if
it so chose.71
Over the next decade, O’Bryan tried to sue Judge Chandler for
defamation, and in one instance he won an award of damages in state court
that was later overturned.72 The New York Times covered this lawsuit.73 All
the while, O’Bryan remained a disbarred attorney.74
One of the few judicial impediments to arise from this issue occurred in
1965, when Judge Chandler refused to disqualify himself from a contested
case between Texaco Oil and an Oklahoma corporation.75 The local
attorney who defended Judge Chandler in state court against O’Bryan’s libel
claim also represented the Oklahoma based corporation, and
Judge Chandler refused to transfer the case to another judge.76 In response

66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 222.
69. Id. at 223.
70. Cf. id. (“The action infuriated Chandler.”).
71. Id.
72. West, supra note 11, at 9.
73. See Judge Loses in Libel Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1967, at 72 (reporting on disbarred attorney
W.H. Pat O’Bryan’s suit against Judge Chandler).
74. See THE BENCHWARMERS, supra note 52, at 221–22 (outlining how O’Bryan was disbarred
in the federal courts and later also disbarred in the state courts).
75. See Texaco v. Chandler, 354 F.2d 655, 656 (10th Cir. 1965) (detailing Judge Chandler’s
refusal to disqualify himself from the Texaco suit in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 455).
76. See id. (explaining Judge Chandler’s connection to attorney John M. Cantrell).
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to Texaco’s appeals, the Tenth Circuit issued a writ of mandamus and
disqualified Judge Chandler from the trial.77
Another aspect of judicial conduct highlighted in Goulden’s book had to
do with Judge Chandler’s visible animus towards Armand Hammer and
Occidental Petroleum.78 Hammer, a wealthy oil magnate, owned a large
portion of Parker Petroleum, an Oklahoma-based oil corporation. In 1962,
he tried to reorganize Parker Petroleum.79 Judge Chandler was assigned
this case pursuant to the district court’s case assignment rules.80 In turn,
Judge Bohanon objected to Judge Chandler’s appointment, but to no
avail.81 Judge Chandler held a number of ex-parte hearings—without the
presence of Hammer or Occidental—in which he cast aspersions on
them.82 The hearings were transcribed, yet Judge Chandler refused to
provide them to any party—even directing the transcriptionist not to turn
them over until the Tenth Circuit ordered him to produce them.83 This led
the Tenth Circuit to disqualify Judge Chandler from the Parker Petroleum
reorganization case.84 Again, following disqualification, Judge Chandler
filed an interlocutory appeal and a writ of mandamus.85
Finally, in April of 1965, a state district attorney secured an indictment
against Judge Chandler for defrauding the state of its tax revenues.86 The
indictment alleged that Judge Chandler had pressured the state to build

77. See id. at 657 (finding inapposite Judge Chandler, and holding he could no longer proceed
in the Texaco case).
78. See THE BENCHWARMERS, supra note 52, at 226 (“Chandler said he felt Hammer was trying
to ‘choke his company to death . . . so that they can milk it . . . . I intend to say that from the bench
because I verily believe it to be true.’” (citation omitted)).
79. See id. at 224 (examining the plan to reorganize Parker Petroleum set forth by Dr. Armand
Hammer of Occidental Petroleum).
80. See id. (showing Judge Chandler began presiding over the Occidental case after Judge Wallace’s
death).
81. See id. at 225 (“Bohanon was arguing with [Judge] Chandler that bankruptcy and other
reorganization cases should be split equitably among the four judges of the Western District.”).
82. Id. at 226.
83. Id. at 227.
84. Id. at 229; see also Occidental Petroleum v. Chandler, 303 F.2d 55, 57 (10th Cir. 1962) (“It is
therefore ordered that the Honorable Stephen S. Chandler, respondent herein, shall proceed no further
in the matter of Parker Petroleum Co. . . . .”).
85. Cf. THE BENCHWARMERS, supra note 52, at 232 (attempting to overturn the judgement,
Judge Chandler spent several years filing appeals and unsuccessfully tried to have the Order reversed
by the Supreme Court).
86. See Preliminary Information, Oklahoma v. Chandler (1965) (on file with the Library of
Congress) (indicting Judge Chandler for conspiring to defraud the State of Oklahoma).

104

ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS

[Vol. 8:90

roads into the Smiling Hills development at the taxpayers’ expense.87
Claiming judicial immunity, Judge Chandler refused to appear at his own
arraignment and then filed disbarment actions against the district attorney.88
On November 3, 1965, the state’s major newspaper, the Daily Oklahoman,
reported on its front page that a state grand jury had summoned
Judge Chandler to testify.89 The next day, the newspaper reported
Judge Chandler’s attorneys’ statement that the grand jury lacked authority
to issue the subpoena.90 Not even a week later, the Daily Oklahoman
headlined its front page with “Grand Jury Indicts Chandler.”91 Ultimately,
a state trial judge dismissed the indictment after learning that the contested
roads existed prior to Smiling Hills being contemplated.92 Although
Judge Chandler had not broken any state laws, his dismissiveness of the
State’s legal system brought his judicial abilities into further question.93
There are other aspects of Judge Chandler’s personality, judicial actions,
and extra-judicial activities that Goulden did not cover, but are still pertinent
to the legislative investigation of him, as well as to the process of his judicial
appeals. In 1962, Harlan Grimes, an Oklahoma attorney, complained to
Congressman Celler that Judge Chandler had received payoffs from parties
appearing in his court, and for two years, Grimes pressed
Congressman Celler to take action against Judge Chandler.94 In 1964,

87. See id. (alleging Judge Chandler conspired to use material belonging to Oklahoma County to
construct a private road); see also THE BENCHWARMERS, supra note 52, at 236 (referring to the criminal
case against Judge Chandler).
88. THE BENCHWARMERS, supra note 52, at 236.
89. Grand Jurors Call Chandler, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 3, 1965, at 1.
90. Mary Goddard, Chandler’s Challenge of Subpoena Denied, Jury Date Up in Air, DAILY
OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 4, 1965, at 1 [hereinafter Goddard, Chandler’s Challenge]; Mary Goddard, Chandler’s
Date with Jury Remains Up in Air, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 4, 1965, at 1.
91. Katherine Hatch, Grand Jury Indicts Chandler, Kessler, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 10, 1965,
at 1.
92. See THE BENCHWARMERS, supra note 52, at 236 (asserting Judge Chandler’s exoneration
ultimately occurred because “the county had owned the roads since 1957”); West, supra note 11, at 10
(“The indictment was quashed when an Oklahoma State judge found the evidence presented to the
grand jury was insufficient to show that a crime had been committed.”).
93. See Goddard, Chandler’s Challenge, supra note 90 (advancing Judge Chandler’s opposition of
the state legal system through his attorneys’ assertion that the grand jury had no authority to indict
him).
94. Letter from Jack Brooks, U.S. Representative, to Emanuel Celler, Chairman, House
Judiciary Comm. (July 6, 1962) (on file with the Library of Congress). Congressman Brooks, in his
response to Congressman Celler, indicated that neither congressman had any knowledge of Grimes or
Judge Chandler. Id. Specifically, Brooks wrote:
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Grimes insisted to Congressman Celler that he had evidence
Judge Chandler pressure a party to deed property to his daughter for a
significant reduction in price over the property’s value.95 By this time,
Grimes had gained notoriety for exposing corruption, particularly bribes, in
the Oklahoma Supreme Court.96 Grimes uncovered that three state justices
had accepted payoffs in exchange for issuing favorable decisions.97 The
press covered Chief Judge N.S. Corn’s acceptance of over $150,000 in
payoffs,98 and the Daily Oklahoman attempted to link Judge Chandler with
Chief Judge Corn.99 However, there was no link between the state justices
and Judge Chandler, and, in fact, there was evidence that Judge Chandler
had independently accused the state supreme court justice of corruption.100

I received your inquiry concerning a letter from Mr. Harlan Grimes of Dallas concerning
information he has received in regard to a member of the Federal Judiciary.
I have not heard any reports along the lines that Mr. Grimes relates in his letter . . . . And as a
matter of fact, I don’t believe I have ever heard of this particular charge before.
Id. Congressman Celler responded, “May I suggest that you make some very discreet inquiries
concerning the conduct of the charge and let me know what, if anything, you have found.” Letter
from Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Comm., to Jack Brooks, U.S. Representative
(Feb. 23, 1966) (on file with the Library of Congress).
95. Letter from Harlan Grimes, to Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Comm.
(June 1, 1964) (on file with the Library of Congress). Grimes claimed:
[I]n June 1956, when Judge Chandler walked into his, Abbott’s office, laid a deed form with tendollar check attached on his desk and informed Mr. Abbott that he, Chandler, was going to give
him, Abbott, five thousand dollars for an acre of land that had a market value of at least fifteen
thousand dollars at the time, that [Judge] Chandler told Abbott[,] “You are in trouble and I am
going to help you[.]”
Id.
96. See State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Grimes, 436 P.2d 40, 43 (Okla. 1967) (“The complaint
charged [Grimes] with making three separate false charges of bribery against various members of this
Court.”).
97. See, e.g., In re Grimes, 364 F.2d 654, 655–56 (10th Cir. 1966) (explaining how the Oklahoma
Bar association commenced disbarment proceedings against Grimes after he had publicly accused
“members of the Supreme Court of the state of Oklahoma with having received a bribe for the
rendering of an opinion”). In 1949, Grimes published a pamphlet claiming that several judges in
Oklahoma were corrupt. Id.
TIMES,
July 19,
1964,
98. Scandal
Shakes
Oklahoma
Court,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/1964/07/19/scandal-shakes-oklahoma-court.html
[perma.cc/3JR2UKZH].
99. See Tarred with Same Brush, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, July 3, 1964, at 12 (“For the integrity of
the whole court is affected as matters stand.”).
100. Cf. West, supra note 11, at 6–8 (showing Judge Chandler’s actions in relation to Judge
Corn’s behavior).
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Like O’Bryan, Grimes professionally suffered as a result of his allegations
against Judge Chandler. In 1959, the Oklahoma Supreme Court ordered
Grimes be disbarred from the practice of law after he first alleged that the
state justices had accepted bribes.101 In spite of Judge Chandler’s
innocence in regard to the state corruption, Grimes’ accusation was
recognized and taken into consideration by the Council when it investigated
Judge Chandler.102
B. The Legislative Purpose of the Judicial Council
Even with the notoriety of Judge Chandler’s conduct, failure of both the
House Judiciary Committee and Congress to seek an impeachment against
him was reasonable. There was no clear evidence that Judge Chandler had
accepted bribes.103 He appeared, at worst, to lack judgment and was overly
irascible toward litigants.104 Questions arising from judicial impartiality and
temperament are generally matters for appeal only, and in the absence of
evidence of corruption, judicial irascibility—a trait complained of
throughout the history of the Republic—is not a basis for impeachment.105
On the other hand, there was an apparent need for some amount of
judicial supervision over Judge Chandler, given his demeanor, if not his
obstinacy in refusing to recuse himself. Whether the law enabled such
supervision was a matter of interpretation. Under the law, a chief justice
could have exercised supervisory authority to assign Judge Chandler cases,
or to temporarily add federal judges to Judge Chandler’s district so as to
101. See In re Application of Grimes for Reinstatement to the Practice of Law, 494 P.2d 635,
637 (Okla. 1971) (denying Grimes’ application for reinstatement into the Oklahoma state bar after
being disbarred in May of 1960, and detailing Grimes’ accusations against the justices).
102. Cf. West, supra note 11, at 10 (“[Judge Chandler’s] travails were a regular feature in the local
newspapers and they were an unending source of frustration and embarrassment to the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals. Inexorably, they led to a showdown with the Tenth Circuit Judicial Council.”).
103. But cf. id. at 7 (implying Judge Chandler was fearful an “outraged public might demand
wholesale reform” of judicial conduct in light of Judge Corn’s sworn statement admitting to accepting
bribes).
104. See id. at 5 (detailing an order removing Judge Chandler from a case because of his
“personal enmity, hostility, bias and prejudice against [the litigant party]”).
105. Cf. Timothy S. Huebner, Emory Speer and Federal Enforcement of the Rights of African Americans,
55 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 34, 61–62 (2015) (assigning a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee
to investigate the unseemly behavior of Judge Emory Speer, and finding “the inconclusive nature of
most of the testimony forced the subcommittee to forego impeachment”). Judge Emory Speer, an
aged Civil War veteran appointed by President Chester Arthur, was accused of intemperate conduct
while on the bench. Id. at 61. However, no vote was taken to impeach, and he continued in his judicial
duties until his death in 1918. Id. at 62–63.
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minimize Judge Chandler’s case load.106 Congress passed the law
establishing this in 1922, and upon recommendation of President William
H. Taft, also established the Judicial Conference of the United States.107
The 1922 Act enabled the United States Supreme Court Chief Justice to call
an annual conference of the senior appellate judges to propose legislation to
Congress regarding the administration of the judiciary—in addition to
authorizing the Chief Justice to temporarily reassign district court judges to
districts that were inundated with large numbers of trials.108 The 1922 Act
was a predecessor to the establishment of judicial councils.109
In 1939, Congress passed an act known as the Administrative Office Act,
empowering the federal judiciary to regulate itself.110 This was partly the
result of a judicial assertion against President Franklin Roosevelt’s “courtpacking” plan.111 The part of the 1939 Act which is now codified as
28 U.S.C. §§ 601–10 created the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts.112 In a sense, the 1939 Act was an expansion of the 1922 Act; the
composition of the Conference created by the 1922 Act remained the same,
although, the 1939 Act expanded its duties and authority.113 The 1922 Act
required the United States Supreme Court Chief Justice to annually convene

106. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2012) (codifying section 2 of chapter 306 of Pub. L. No. 67-298, and
establishing the Conference of Circuit Judges of the United States).
107. Act of Sept. 14, 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-298, ch. 306, 42 Stat. 837 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 331
(2012)); PETER GRAHAM FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 30–31
(1973).
108. Act of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 306, 42 Stat. at 838–39; see also J. Clifford Wallace, Must We Have
the Nunn Bill? The Alternative of Judicial Councils of the Circuits, 51 IND. L.J. 297, 311–12 (1976) (explaining
the creation and purpose of the Judicial Conference).
109. Cf. FISH, supra note 107, at 30–31 (portraying the Act as a seed spawned by President Taft
with the intent to develop the Act into a reform of “inferior federal courts”).
110. Administrative Office Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-299, 53 Stat. 1223 (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 601–10 (2012)); see Fish, supra note 18, at 203–06 (describing the Act of 1939, which
provided the Federal Judiciary with a complete administrative system in both the United States Judicial
Conference and the federal judicial councils). Congress acted in concert with the advice of Chief Justice
Charles Evans Hughes, along with Chief Judges John J. Parker of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, and Duncan Groener of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Id. at 205–08;
accord JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 114 (Boston,
Little, Brown & Co. 1950) (discussing the Act of 1939).
111. Fish, supra note 19, at 205–06.
112. Administrative Office Act, § 302, 53 Stat. at 1223.
113. Compare Act of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 306, 42 Stat. at 838 (establishing the Conference of
Circuit Judges of the United States), with Administrative Office Act of 1939, § 302–305, 53 Stat.
at 1223–24 (amending the 1922 Act, and adding to the Conference’s duties and authority associated
with the AO).
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a meeting of the chief judges of the courts of appeals.114 The meeting,
titled “Judicial Conference of the United States,” was charged with the duty
of compiling statistics on matters such as the individual case-loads of the
district courts, judicial finances, the need to create new judgeships, and the
requirement to temporarily transfer district court judges to districts
experiencing an increase in the number of trials.115 The 1922 Act
empowered the United States Supreme Court Chief Justice to summon the
Attorney General of the United States to report on the numbers and types
of cases to which the United States was a party, as well as provide the
Attorney General a means for bringing complaints against judges.116 The
Conference was also tasked with the duty of providing an annual report to
Congress for the purpose of evaluating the need to create new judicial
positions or increase fiscal expenditures for the judiciary.117 Today, the
Judicial Conference is the pinnacle of the internal hierarchy for assessing
federal judicial policies and rules, as well as examining judicial conduct.118
In 1966, the New York Times informed its readers that the Conference was
in the process of weighing proposals for the removal of unfit judges, and
noted that Judge Chandler was one of the reasons for this effort.119

114. Act of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 306, 42 Stat. at 838.
115. The 1922 Act specifically required:
Said conference shall make a comprehensive survey of the condition of business in the courts of
the United States and prepare plans for assignment and transfer of judges to or from circuits or
districts where the state of the docket or condition of business indicates the need therefor, and
shall submit such suggestions to the various courts as may seem in the interest of uniformity and
expedition of business.
See id. In 1948, the Judicial Code renamed the Conference of Circuit Judges of the United States to
the Judicial Conference of the United States. See Judicial Code of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, ch. 646,
62 Stat. 902, 902 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2012)).
116. Act of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 306, 42 Stat. at 839 (“The Attorney General shall, upon request
of the Chief Justice, report to said conference on matters relating to the business of the several courts
of the United States, with particular reference to causes or proceedings in which the United States may
be a party.”).
117. Id. at 838 (requiring circuit court judges to provide information regarding the caseload in
their docket, and recommendations for additional “judicial assistance” for the disposal of their
caseload, which will in turn be converted into a survey).
118. Cf. RULES FOR JUD. CONDUCT & JUD. DISABILITY PROC. § 320, r. 2 cmt. (JUD. CONF.
U.S. 2015) [hereinafter RULES FOR JUD. CONDUCT], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judgesjudgeships/judicial-conduct-disability [perma.cc/L7X9-ZV2Q] (providing “nationally uniform
provisions” governing judicial misconduct and ethics).
119. U.S. Judges Weigh Proposals for Removal of Unfit Jurists, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1966, at 31.
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The part of the 1939 Act that is now codified as 28 U.S.C. § 332 created
a system of judicial councils within each circuit in an effort to make trials
more efficient.120 In this, Congress empowered each circuit court of
appeals to curtail an administrative mechanism for court governance.121
Today, under 28 U.S.C § 332, each circuit has a council, “consisting of the
chief judge of the circuit . . . and an equal number of circuit judges and
district judges of the circuit.”122 In 1939, no appellate judge—except for
those on senior status—was exempt from serving on a council.123 One of
the administrative aspects of a council was that it could allocate trials to
judges in the district courts containing more than one district court judge,
particularly in instances when the district court judges were unable to agree
upon the assignment of cases.124 Congress’ purpose in empowering a
judicial council to assign cases in an administrative capacity, rather than a
circuit court doing so in a judicial capacity, was to preserve litigants their
right to move a trial judge for recusal.125 In 1948, Congress amended this
part of the 1939 Act to enable the councils to “freeze” an overburdened
judge’s caseload until the case “backload” was alleviated.126 In 1976, John
120. Administrative Office Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-299, §§ 306–07, 53 Stat. 1223, 1223–24
(codified as amended in 28 U.S.C. § 332 (2012)); see also WOLF HEYDERBRAND & CARROLL SERON,
RATIONALIZING JUSTICE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 37
(1990) (explaining the establishment of the judicial councils and their purpose).
121. Administrative Office Act of 1939, § 306–07, 53 Stat. at 1223–24.
122. 28 U.S.C. § 332 (2012).
123. Administrative Office Act of 1939, § 307, 53 Stat. at 1223–24 (“A conference shall be
held . . . which conference shall be composed of circuit and district judges in such circuit who reside
within the continental United States, with participation in such conference on the part of members of
the bar under rules to be prescribed by the circuit court . . . .”).
124. Notably the 1939 Act stated:
The senior judge shall submit to the council the quarterly reports of the Director required to be
filed by the provisions of section 304, clause (2), and such action shall be taken thereon by the
council as may be necessary. It shall be the duty of the district judges promptly to carry out the
directions of the council as to the administration of the business of their respective courts.
Nothing contained in this section shall affect the provisions of existing law relating to the
assignment of district judges to serve outside of the districts for which they, respectively, were
appointed.
Id. at § 306, 53 Stat. at 1224. Cf. Fish, supra note 19, at 207 (“Although wide agreement existed on the
scope of the councils’ powers, judges differed over the manner of exercising this power and over the
degree of permitted coercion.”).
125. Cf. Fish, supra note 19, at 208 (suggesting one argument for a multi-judge council is to
promote “greater confidence on the part of the bar and public”).
126. Judicial Code of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 902, 902 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 332 (2012)) (“Each judicial council shall make all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious
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Clifford Wallace, a judge on the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
opined that 28 U.S.C. § 332 was “a broad grant of power” to the courts of
appeals.127 However, as the Ninth Circuit noted in 1980, a judicial council’s
rules do not provide an additional means for appeal.128
To fully place the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit’s conduct
concerning Judge Chandler into perspective, a third act requires mention;
Congress never directly delegated authority to the courts of appeals to
determine judicial case assignments. Under 28 U.S.C. § 137, districts,
containing more than one district court judge, are to allocate their case-loads
according to local district court rules.129 These rules are proposed by the
chief district court judge and agreed upon by a majority of judges within the
district to ensure an equitable distribution of cases.130 However, in
administration of the business of the courts within its circuit. The district judges shall promptly carry
into effect all orders of the judicial council.”); accord MARY L. VOLCANSEK, JUDICIAL IMPEACHMENT:
NONE CALLED FOR JUSTICE 10 (1993) (arguing the 1939 Act provided councils the authority to
“freeze judges’ caseloads until backlogs were cleared, assign judges to virtually nonexistent jurisdictions,
and certify judges’ physical and mental disability”).
127. See Wallace, supra note 108, at 312–13 (“There seems to be little doubt that Congress
intended a broad grant of power under section 332(d).”). It is noteworthy that Judge Wallace also
acknowledged that there was a disagreement over the nature of the council’s powers. He penned:
Some view the councils as purely administrative bodies without any judicial powers whose role is
to deal with the problems of administering the courts. Others see the councils as a body with
certain judicial powers, including the power to determine the fitness of a judge to hear cases. The
legislative history is subject to both interpretations. But it should be noted that the creation of
the councils was part of an Act, the overall purpose of which was to speed the administration of
justice.
Id. at 313.
128. See In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 613 F.2d 768, 769 (9th Cir. 1980) (“The Procedures
are not intended to provide an alternative avenue for appealing a judge’s rulings in a particular case.”).
This decision arose from a suit brought by inmates housed in the Arizona state penal system. Id. The
inmates sought habeas review (“administrative remedies”) from the district court. Id. When the district
court did not grant a review, the inmate petitioners alleged the judge was biased and that recusal was
required. Id. However, they alleged this claim to the Council. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that
administrative remedies were not available as a substitute for judicial remedies, and, because there was
a mechanism for the disqualification of judges, the inmate petitioners could not seek redress through
the Council. Id.
129. See 28 U.S.C. § 137 (1976) (“The business of a court having more than one judge shall be
divided among the judges . . . .”).
130. See id. (explaining the role district court judges have in managing case-loads). This section
reads in its entirety:
The business of a court having more than one judge shall be divided among the judges as provided
by the rules and orders of the court. The chief judge of the district court shall be responsible for
the observance of such rules and orders, and shall divide the business and assign the cases so far
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instances where the district court judges are unable to agree to the division
of cases (or the adoption of case allocation rules), the judicial councils
possess the authority to “make necessary orders” for case distribution.131
This system is designed to enable administrative oversight over the district
courts without impinging on their independence.132 In theory, as long as
the district court judges agree to the division of cases (and as long as the
case assignment rules do not enable litigants to obtain a judge of their
choice), a judicial council possesses no authority to encroach into district
court administration.133
Judge Chandler became Chief Judge of the United States District Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma in 1956,134 and as Chief Judge, he
inherited a scheme for the distribution of cases from the previous chief
under 28 U.S.C. § 137—by “secret lot.”135 He did not alter this
arrangement, and the other judges of Oklahoma’s Western District agreed
with the case assignment scheme, thus, it was consistent with 28 U.S.C.
§ 137.136 Assuming the 28 U.S.C. § 137 “secret lot” system was designed
to prevent forum shopping by litigants, it is important to note that there is
no evidence that any judge in the Western District of Oklahoma opposed
this system.
Prior to Chandler I and II, the United States Supreme Court had not
addressed 28 U.S.C. § 137, or §§ 331–32.137 In 1964, the D.C. Circuit Court

as such rules and orders do not otherwise prescribe. If the district judges in any district are unable
to agree upon the adoption of rules or orders for that purpose the judicial council of the circuit
shall make the necessary orders.
Id.
131. Id.
132. Cf. Fish, supra note 19, at 222 (asserting the absence of subpoena powers make it difficult
for a judicial council to interfere with relations between litigants and judges, and implying that necessity
of such intervention is evidently necessary).
133. See, e.g., Fish, supra note 19, at 216–17 (“Circuit councils have been formally designated as
arbiters of disagreements over administrative policies in the lower courts.”).
134. U.S. Judge Stephen Chandler, 89; Often Feuded with His Colleagues, supra note 22.
135. See Stanley, Jr. & Russell, supra note 25, at 136 (discussing the Order requesting a stay of
Judge Chandler’s inherited cases).
136. See id. at 137 (“If the judges of a district court are unable to agree upon rules and orders
for dividing the workload among them, then by statute, the circuit councils must issue the needed
orders.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 137)).
137. See generally Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 75–76 (addressing the “scope and constitutionality of
the powers of the Judicial Councils under 28 U.S.C. §§ 137 and 332[,]” and proclaiming the issues as
questions of first impression).
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of Appeals held in Washington v. Clemmer,138 a per curiam decision, that a
judge possessed the administrative authority to order a grand jury
commissioner to supply a stenographer for a preliminary hearing convened
to determine whether a defendant could be held in confinement pending a
grand jury.139 In Washington, however, the commissioner not only refused
to order a stenographer for the preliminary hearing, but he also refused to
issue subpoenas to potential alibi witnesses that could have altered the grand
jury’s decision on the indictment.140 After the district court judge
erroneously ruled that he lacked the authority to issue a habeas writ or to
order the commissioner to supply the stenographer and issue subpoenas,
the appellate court vacated the district court’s ruling, ordering the judge to
abide by his authority to force the commissioner to comply with the
fundamental fairness requirements of due process.141 In his dissent, Judge
John Anthony Danaher argued that the majority’s order to the defendant
was administrative in nature and should have been resolved through the
circuit’s judicial council under 28 U.S.C. § 332 rather than through the
formal habeas writ.142
In 1957, the Supreme Court, in La Buy v. Howes Leather Co.,143—a
decision Justice Harlan cited to explain his concurrence in Chandler—held
that courts of appeals possessed the discretionary authority to issue writs of
mandamus to compel a district court to proceed to trial.144 Leading up to
that decision, District Court Judge Walter A. La Buy (a Franklin Roosevelt
appointee) had become flustered with a large number of plaintiffs and
defendants in two civil anti-trust cases involving allegations of monopolistic
price fixing in the production and sale of shoe repair items.145 Instead of
138. Washington v. Clemmer, 339 F.2d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (per curiam).
139. See id. at 717–18 (granting a judge the right to order a stenographer during a preliminary
hearing on behalf of a defendant).
140. Id. at 716, 718.
141. See id. at 718 (“We are sure that the Commissioner and the District Court will have no
difficulty in providing a procedure for the formal approval of indigent subpoenas by a judge which
Rule 17(b) seems to require.”).
142. See id. at 722–23 (Danaher, J., dissenting) (“28 U.S.C. § 332 (1958) authorizes the Judicial
Council composed of all the active judges of the circuit to ‘make all necessary orders for the effective
and expeditious administration of the business of the courts within its circuit.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 332 (1958))).
143. La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
144. See id. at 259–60 (holding the court of appeals may exert control over district courts in
order to administer the federal judicial system).
145. See id. at 252 (showcasing how “[t]he record indicates that the cases had been burdensome
to the petitioner”).
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continuing with the two cases, Judge La Buy consolidated them and then
transferred them to a special master.146 With the consent of the parties, a
special master could be appointed to determine contested interlocutory
matters as well as shepherd the parties into a settlement.147 However, none
of the parties consented to Judge La Buy’s transfer of duties. Instead, they
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.148 The Seventh
Circuit issued a writ of mandamus and ordered Judge La Buy to proceed
with the case.149 In response, Judge La Buy appealed to the Supreme Court,
which held that a federal appellate court could—within its judicial
function—exercise supervisory authority over its district courts.150 Justice
William Brennan, joined by Justices Felix Frankfurter, Harold Burton, and
John Marshall Harlan, dissented from the decision on the basis that
Judge La Buy’s action did not create an exceptional circumstance under the
All Writs Act to justify the issuance of the writ of mandamus.151 The
dissenters also urged that the Court’s decision would enable appellate court
intrusions into trial processes under a theory that any matter which might
later arise in an appeal could be appealable during a trial.152 If this occurred,
the Justices cautioned, trials could last for years.153
146. Id.
147. See id. at 266 (“The references to the master were made under the authority of Rule 53(b)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
148. See generally Howes Leather Co. v. La Buy, 226 F.2d 703 (7th Cir. 1955) (manifesting the
parties’ appeal to the Seventh Circuit in light of La Buy’s transfer to a special master).
149. Id. at 706.
150. See La Buy, 352 U.S. at 259–60 (“We believe that supervisory control of the District Courts
by the Courts of Appeals is necessary to proper judicial administration in the federal system.”).
151. See id. at 260 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I do not agree that the writ directing Judge La Buy
to vacate the order of reference was within the bounds of the discretionary power of the Court of
Appeals to issue extraordinary writ under the All Writs Act.”).
152. See id. at 263 (“What this Court is saying, therefore, is that the All Writs Act confers an
independent appellate power in the Courts of Appeals to review interlocutory orders. I have always
understood the law to be precisely to the contrary.”).
153. See id. at 267–68 (“That standard allows interlocutory appeals by leave of the appellate
court. The federal policy of limited interlocutory review stresses the inconvenience and expense of
piecemeal reviews and the strong public interest in favor of a single and complete trial with a single
and complete review.”). The dissent goes on to say,
I protest, not only because we invade a domain reserved by the Constitution exclusively to the
Congress, but as well because the encouragement to interlocutory appeals offered by this decision
must necessarily aggravate further the already bad condition of calendar congestion in some of
our District Courts and also add to the burden of work of some of our busiest Courts of Appeals.
More petitions for interlocutory review, requiring the attention of the Courts of Appeals, add, of
course, to the burden of work of those courts.
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La Buy did not arise from facts similar to those at issue in the Supreme
Court’s Chandler I opinion, and the Seventh Circuit’s use of the mandamus
writ required it only to comply with a set legal standard for interlocutory
appeals granted in federal court.154 In Chandler I, there was no legal
standard employed by the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, that is, the
Council never determined the issues before it under a preponderance of the
evidence—or any other articulated standard.155 On the other hand, one
might presume that Justice Brennan’s action in dissenting in La Buy may
have forced him to join with the majority in Chandler I. In an early draft of
his La Buy dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the Seventh Circuit had an
obligation through its Judicial Council to conduct an “efficient, businesslike calendar,” and it should have used the Council—rather than expand the
narrow mandamus legal doctrine—to order Judge La Buy to proceed.156
C. The Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit and Judge Chandler
On January 21, 1966, the Supreme Court refused to issue a stay against
the Tenth Circuit Judicial Council from acting against Judge Chandler.157
This date (aside from its obvious importance as a date of issuance) puts the
rapidity of the Council’s actions into context. The Court, for reasons noted
below, appeared to have been confused as to how to address
Judge Chandler’s appeal, for at no time did the investigating judges of the
Council explain why they could impartially review Judge Chandler’s
actions.158
Understanding the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s composition
is important to contextualize its actions. Alfred Murrah served as the Chief
Judge of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals (President Roosevelt appointed
Id. at 268 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
154. La Buy, 352 U.S. at 249.
155. Cf. Chandler I, 382 U.S. at 1003 (Black, J., dissenting) (“The reason given by the Council for
this drastic action is that it ‘finds that Judge Chandler is presently unable, or unwilling to discharge
efficiently the duties of his office.’”).
156. See William Brennan, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Unpublished Draft Dissent (Dec. 17,
1956), in La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957) (on file with the Library of Congress)
(explaining 28 U.S.C. § 332 grants the Seventh Circuit the authority to use its Judicial Council to carry
out administrative functions of the court). This language did not make it into the published dissent
after Justice Frankfurter advised against it. Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court,
to William Brennan, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (1956) (on file with the Library of Congress).
157. Chandler I, 382 U.S. at 1003.
158. Cf. id. at 1003 (Black, J., dissenting) (“The reason given by the Council for this drastic
action is that it ‘finds that Judge Chandler is presently unable, or unwilling to discharge efficiently the
duties of his office.’”).
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him in 1940) but, from 1937 through 1940, Judge Murrah was a United
States District Court Judge for the Western District of Oklahoma.159 When
Judge Murrah left to serve for the Tenth Circuit, Roosevelt appointed
Judge Chandler to replace him in Oklahoma’s Western District.160 Thus,
the Tenth Circuit members were Judge David T. Lewis, Judge Jean
S. Breitenstein, Judge Delmas C. Hill, Judge Oliver Seth, and
President Dwight David Eisenhower appointed
Judge Murrah.161
Judge Lewis and Judge Breitenstein, while Judge Hill and Judge Seth were
both appointed by President John F. Kennedy.162 In 1964, Judge Chandler
criticized the entire Tenth Circuit—and singled out Judge Murrah—in a
speech.163 Judge Murrah recused himself from voting in the Judicial
Council on any matters involving Judge Chandler.164 Judge Murrah also
disqualified himself from appointing any district court judges to replace
Judge Chandler on pending cases.165 Because Judge Chandler attacked
Judge Murrah’s credibility in a public forum, it might have been required
that a different judicial council examine Judge Chandler’s conduct, yet no
statutory mechanism existed to force this issue.166
On December 13, 1965, the Judicial Council held a secret meeting,
excluding Judge Chandler, and then issued an Order effectively stripping
159. See GREAT AMERICAN JUDGES AN ENCYCLOPEDIA, VOL. II, L–Z 564 (John R. Vile ed.,
2003) (outlining Murrah’s route to appointment).
160. See id. at 564, 569 (detailing Murrah’s rise to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, and his
disagreements with Judge Chandler). Vile wrote that Murrah, despite being a talented jurist, was
ineffective in handling his dispute with Judge Chandler. Id.
161. Order from the Special Session of the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the U.S.
at 1, Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the U.S., 382 U.S. 1004 (1966) (No. 1111,
Misc.) [hereinafter Order No. 1111] (on file with the Library of Congress).
162. Judges of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, TENTH CIR. HIST. SOC’Y,
http://www.10thcircuithistory.org/list-tenth-circuit-judges [perma.cc/D93F-EK7E] (listing judges on
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the president who appointed each judge).
163. Cf. Terence Kern, Judge Alfred P. Murrah—A Vision of Things, 29 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
737, 752 (2004) (mentioning Judge Chandler and Murrah had several conflicting issues, and
highlighting Judge Chandler’s public criticism of Murrah).
164. See Order No. 1111, supra note 161, at 1–2 (noting Murrah’s absence in a proceeding
related to Judge Chandler).
165. Letter from John F. Davis, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Byron White, Justice, U.S.
Supreme Court (Feb. 3, 1966) (on file with the Library of Congress) (reporting Judge Murrah
disqualified himself from the O’Bryan v. Chandler case, and that he wrote to Judge Lewis suggesting
Judge Lewis act in the matter).
166. See Order No. 1111, supra note 161, at 2 (“The Council noted the reference by the Supreme
Court to the statement in the response of the Solicitor General that the Council contemplated further
proceedings and the order of the Supreme Court that the application for stay be denied ‘pending this
contemplated prompt action of the Judicial Council.’” (citation omitted)).
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him of his judicial powers by barring him from serving on cases.167 The
secret meeting—even if administrative—would have violated the
constitutional principles of notice and opportunity to be heard, unless,
perhaps, it could be determined that Judge Chandler had no substantial
interest in the outcome.168 While it was true that the December 13 Order
did not cost Judge Chandler his income, his ability to function as an
Article III judge with full constitutional protections certainly was
affected.169 Additionally, the Council’s December 13 Order declared that
because Judge Chandler was “unable or unwilling to discharge efficiently
[his] duties . . .” he could no longer be assigned to cases.170 But there was
no proof of this charge, and the findings of the Council did not include any
standards of proof or evidence to sustain it.171
On January 21, 1966, Judge Chandler appealed to Justice Byron White to
stay the Council’s December 13 Order.172 Justice White did not grant the
Stay on the basis that Judge Chandler’s appeal was “interlocutory in
character” and therefore not ripe for a grant of review.173 Although
Justice White issued the denial of a stay on January 21, initially it was Chief
Justice Warren who authored the draft denial, assuming that since he was
Chief Justice and head of the Judicial Conference, the duty fell to him.174
Chief Justice Warren’s draft simply held that the Court would not consider
interlocutory appeals from administrative acts.175 However, Justice Harlan
objected to Chief Justice Warren’s terse, single-sentence denial.176
167. See id. (mentioning the December 13 meeting).
168. See generally Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (establishing required procedures to
deprive a person of substantial rights).
169. See Order No. 1111, supra note 161, at 2 (suggesting Judge Chandler appear before the
Judicial Council for a hearing to determine whether he would continue to preside over cases).
170. Chandler I, 382 U.S. 1003, 1003 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
171. See id. (majority opinion) (failing to discuss the proof of the charge against Judge Chandler,
or to adopt a standard by which to evaluate the Judicial Council’s charge); Order No. 1111, supra
note 161, at 2 (defining the Judicial Council’s findings without an analysis under an appropriate
standard).
172. See Chandler I, 382 U.S. at 1003 (discussing Judge Chandler’s appeal to stay the Council’s
Order).
173. See id. at 1003–04 (noting a final judgment was to be rendered before the decision could
be appealed to the Supreme Court).
174. Memorandum from Earl Warren, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Conference
(Jan. 19, 1966) (on file with the Library of Congress) (discussing his prior draft denial).
175. Id.
176. See Letter from Jane to Byron White, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Jan. 20, 1966) (on file
with the Library of Congress) (noting Justice Harlan had concerns over the draft denial and requested
further discussion with Justice White).
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Because Chief Justice Warren, at the time, was in Missouri on holiday, he
asked Justice Fortas to improve on the draft denial.177 This time, Justice
Fortas expanded on the denial, but once more rested it on the basis that
Judge Chandler’s motion was an “entirely interlocutory matter.”178
Justice White disagreed with Justice Fortas, and countered that it was
necessary to acknowledge that at a future date—and based on the Judicial
Council’s future actions—Judge Chandler could have a basis for a
motion.179 Likely because Justice White was responsible for the Tenth
Circuit Judicial Council, he authored the Court’s published Order denying
Judge Chandler a stay of the December 13 Order.180
At the same time, Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall informed the
Court that the Council had notified Judge Chandler that after he exhausted
his docket, he could apply to the Council and certify that he was willing and
able to “undertake new business” in order to become eligible to serve on
new cases.181 The Council also appointed Judge Daugherty to temporarily
take over the assignment of cases.182 Judge Chandler, in turn, objected to
the December 13 Order on the basis that it affixed a new condition to the
exercise of his judicial office.183 Arguably, Judge Chandler’s objection
177. See Memorandum from Abraham Fortas, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to the Brethren
(Jan. 18, 1966) (on file with the Library of Congress) (“At the suggestion of the Chief Justice I am
circulating the following as a possible substitute per curiam for this case . . . .”).
178. See id. (“It appearing to the Court from the response submitted by the Solicitor General on
behalf of the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit that the order from which relief is sought is entirely
interlocutory in character . . . .”).
179. See Letter from Byron White, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Earl Warren, Chief Justice,
U.S. Supreme Court (Jan. 19, 1966) (on file with the Library of Congress) (“I prefer your formulation
of the denial of stay to that of Brother Fortas and I have no objection to your entering it in this form.”).
180. See Letter to Byron White, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Jan. 19, 1966) (on file with the
Library of Congress) (echoing Chandler I’s per curiam opinion was Justice White’s “formulation”).
181. See Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 78–97 (explaining the Council’s Order to Judge Chandler). The
extent of the Order read:
[The] Honorable Stephen S. Chandler shall take no action whatsoever in any case or proceeding
now or hereafter in the United Stated Court for the Western District of Oklahoma; that all cases
and proceedings now assigned to or pending before him shall be reassigned to and among the
other judges of said court; and that until further order of the Judicial Council no cases or
proceedings filed or instituted in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma shall be assigned to him for any action whatsoever.
Id. at 78.
182. See id. (ordering agreement on the division of cases and that if one could not be internally
reached, the Judicial Council would take further steps).
183. See, e.g., Renewal of Application for Stay, Reply to Memorandum Opposing Initial
Application for Stay, and Motion to Strike and Expunge Said Memorandum at 8–9, Chandler v. Judicial

118

ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS

[Vol. 8:90

maintained the ripeness of his appeal despite the majority’s conclusion
otherwise. Once more, the Court denied Judge Chandler relief.184
While Justices Douglas and Black dissented from the denial of the stay,
they acknowledged that judicial councils for each federal court of appeals
had been statutorily created, and that the law vested administrative authority
in the courts of appeals over the district courts within their respective
circuits.185 They dissented on the basis that the Council had overstepped
its constitutional authority and intruded into the legislative prerogative to
impeach.186 The Council’s action against Judge Chandler, they concluded,
had threatened the independence of the judiciary.187 Perhaps it was in
reaction to the January 21 Dissent that Judge Chandler, on the same day,
filed a motion to reconsider in which he accused the Council of engaging in
a “shocking departure from customary bounds of accepted standards by the
inclusion of gratuitous defamatory statements.”188
Both Judge Chandler and the Council were active during the Court’s
deliberations. On January 14, 1966, Judge Chandler informed the other
district court judges of the Council’s December 13 Order demanding that
he cease from hearing cases, and that he desired that the other judges’
confirm his conclusion that the Council had (in effect) issued a de facto writ

Council of the Tenth Circuit of the U.S., 382 U.S. 1003 (1966) (No. 1111, Misc.) [hereinafter Renewal
of Application for Stay] (“Failure to grant a stay will only compound the confusion for litigants in
Judge Chandler’s court . . . [he] regrets the additional burden this entails for the other judges in his
court.”).
184. See Chandler I, 382 U.S. at 1003–04 (noting Judge Chandler was denied relief pursuant to
his Renewal of Application for Stay).
185. Id. at 1004.
186. See id. at 1005–06 (Black, J., dissenting) (noting the powers of impeachment granted to the
Legislative Branch by the Constitution).
187. Id. at 1006. Justice Black’s conclusory statement reads:
To hold that judges can do what this Judicial Council has tried to do to Judge Chandler here
would in my judgment violate the plan of our Constitution to preserve, as far as possible, the
liberty of the people by guaranteeing that they have judges wholly independent of the
Government or any of its agents with the exception of the United States Congress acting under
its limited power of impeachment. We should stop in its infancy, before it has any growth at all,
this idea that the United States district judges can be made accountable for their efficiency or lack
of it to the judges just over them in the federal judicial system.
Id.
188. Renewal of Application for Stay, supra note 183, at 1.
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of prohibition against him.189 Judge Chandler also explained his reasons
for seeking relief from the Court rather than appearing before the panel.190
He pointed out that because no litigant in any pending case had sought his
recusal or filed a writ of mandamus to the appellate court, he believed the
Council was without any power to act under its governing statute, and that
his appearance before the Council would be interpreted (in essence) as
waiving this argument.191 Second, in regards to the cases already under
adjudication, Judge Chandler claimed that as the sitting District Chief Judge,
he was the only judge with the authority to issue orders or rulings to the
litigant parties.192
Additionally, Judge Chandler had a conversation with his colleague, Judge
Daugherty, in which he protested the division of his pending cases to the
other judges.193 As previously noted, customarily, the district chief judge
was responsible for creating a “secret lot” in which cases were assigned to
available judges based on the date in which the various actions were filed
with the court.194 However, Judge Daugherty had attempted an equitable
division of future cases, which negated the secrecy required by the existing
rules.195 Judge Daugherty responded by suggesting that he convene a
meeting of the district court judges to work out an agreement on how to
divide Judge Chandler’s cases amongst themselves.196 But this too nullified
the existing local rules on case division because it ignored the principle of
the “secret lot.”

189. Letter from Stephen Chandler, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Okla., to
the Judges on the U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Okla. 1 (Jan. 14, 1966) (on file with the Library
of Congress).
190. Id. at 2.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 3.
193. See Letter from Stephen Chandler, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Okla.,
to Fred Daugherty, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Okla. (Jan. 24, 1966) (on file with the
Library of Congress) (“There is no provision of law that grants a Judicial Council Jurisdiction over
cases pending before a Judge in the various stages of the judicial process after valid assignment to
him.”).
194. 28 U.S.C. § 137 (1976); see also Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 77 (noting the chief justice of the
court is primarily responsible for assigning cases).
195. See Letter from Stephen Chandler, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Okla.,
to Clerk’s Office (Jan. 19, 1966) (on file with the Library of Congress) (suggesting implications of
Daugherty’s actions).
196. Letter from Fred Daugherty, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Okla., to Stephen
Chandler, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Okla. (Jan. 21, 1966) (on file with the
Library of Congress).
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On January 24, 1966, Judge Chandler wrote to his fellow district judges
informing them that while “he objected to the removal and the
reassignment” of his cases that were pending as of December 28, 1965, he
did not object “to the assignment of all new cases to judges other than
himself.”197 On the next day, the district court judges notified the Council
that while they “had agreed on the division of new business . . . they could
not agree on the assignment to other judges of cases then pending before
Contemporaneously, the Justice Department
Judge Chandler.”198
motioned Judge Chandler to recuse himself from a trial between the United
States and an Oklahoma litigant arising from a tax dispute.199 The New
York Times covered Judge Chandler’s initial refusal to withdraw from the
case, and his later agreement to recuse himself.200
In response to the district court judges’ inability to agree on a division of
cases, the Council instructed them that it would hold a new hearing on
February 10, 1966. However, after being informed that no district court
judge intended to appear before it, the Council decided not to hold this
meeting; instead it decided to consider the disagreement of case assignments
at the February 4 meeting.201 Judge Chandler had independently notified
the Council that he objected to its assertion of jurisdiction in prospectively
removing all cases from him, and suggested that he would not attend the
administrative proceedings.202 Regardless, the Council maintained its
December 13 Order prohibiting Judge Chandler from presiding over any
new trials until the hearing.203
On the last day of January, the Oklahoma Transportation Company’s
counsel filed a notice of amicus brief to the Court siding with
197. Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 79; Letter from Stephen Chandler to Fred Daugherty, supra
note 193 (copying to the letter other district court judges).
198. See Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 79 (expressing an attempt by the Judges to form an agreement).
199. See Fred P. Graham, Oklahoma Judge Clashes with U.S.: Justice Department Objects to His Hearing
Tax Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1966, at 51 (suggesting the Justice Department would object to
Judge Chandler’s hearing of a Federal tax dispute).
200. See id. (insisting Judge Chandler initially refused to withdraw from the case); Chandler Averts
Clash with U.S.: Federal Judge Withdraws from Oklahoma City Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1966, at 13 (detailing
Judge Chandler’s eventual agreement to recuse himself, however, noting that “[Judge] Chandler seems
determined to continue to try private cases, in defiance of the [J]udicial [C]ouncil’s order, until the
Supreme Court rules on his case”).
201. See Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 79–80 (discussing the Council’s consideration of the
disagreement amongst the district judges on the division of business).
202. See Letter from Stephen Chandler to Clerk’s Office, supra note 195 (outlining
Judge Chandler’s objection to the Council’s Order).
203. See Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 80 (suggesting the Council maintained its Order).
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Judge Chandler and requesting reconsideration.204 The company was a
party in an action against the United States on Judge Chandler’s docket
scheduled for trial on February 1, 1966.205 The company’s counsel insisted
that the Council’s action would result in a trial delay to the financial
detriment of the company and enable the government to seek
reconsideration of rulings favorable to the company that Judge Chandler
had already issued.206 It also argued that the Council’s action bypassed the
two recognized means for judicial disqualification: a motion for judicial
recusal based on bias or prejudice subject to appellate review, and voluntary
disqualification.207 Although the corporation raised a meritorious claim in
the sense that the losing party would be able to argue several motions for
reconsideration, this did not lead Justice White to rethink his position. After
conferring with the Court, Justice White appointed Richard Bevan Austin,
a United States District Court Judge serving in the Northern District of
Illinois, to the trial involving the corporation.208
On February 4, the Council—still asserting it was acting under 28 U.S.C
§§ 137 and 332—issued a second Order which authorized Judge Chandler
to proceed with the cases already assigned to him.209 The February 4 Order
also barred Judge Chandler from serving on any new cases.210 This
February 4 Order did not mollify Judge Chandler; again, he asked the Court
for a writ of mandamus.211 Judge Chandler’s objection was two-fold.212
First, he argued the Council, acting within its administrative capacity, lacked
authority to reassign a district court’s cases; and second, if the Council was
204. See Motion of Real Parties in Interest for Leave to File and Motion to Stay Amicus Curiae
at 4, Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the U.S., 382 U.S. 1003 (1966) (No. 1111,
Misc.) (requesting immediate adjudication of the case, noting that any further delay would be
“disastrous to hundreds of litigants and attorneys”).
205. Id. at 1. This letter was sent via Western Union telegram. Id.
206. Id. at 4. The telegram claimed $400,000 in damages were at stake, alleging “[t]he very life
and future operation of the Oklahoma Transportation Company and Affiliated Public Utility Motor
Carriers make immediate trial vital.” Id. at 1–2.
207. Id. at 2.
208. Letter from Byron White, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to John Davis, Clerk, U.S. Supreme
Court (Feb. 3, 1966) (on file with the Library of Congress). Apparently, because the Northern District
of Illinois resided within the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Justice White believed that the
appearance of favoritism to the government was nullified. Id.
209. See Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 80 (citing to the Order rendered from the February 4, 1966
meeting of the Judicial Council).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 75–76.
212. See id. at 82 (evaluating the arguments of (1) the constitutional rights of a confirmed federal
judge; and (2) the statutory authorization of judicial councils to supersede those constitutional rights).
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acting as the Tenth Circuit en banc, it exceeded its authority to order a
blanket recusal against a district court judge.213
Five days after the February 4 Order’s issuance, Solicitor General
Marshall filed a memorandum to the Court arguing Judge Chandler’s appeal
had become moot because Judge Chandler had essentially agreed to the
Council’s February 4 Order.214 Judge Chandler, in turn, filed a notice to
the Court disagreeing with the Solicitor General’s assertion that he had
acquiesced to the February 4 Order, and further stated that he had only
“acquiesced” to the other district court judges’ memorandum to the Council
in order to prevent the Council’s intervention under 28 U.S.C. § 127.215
Yet, Judge Chandler also believed that he made it clear that he had not
acquiesced to any bar from serving on future trials, because he had refrained
from specifically addressing the Council’s stated reasons for his removal.216
This became a contested issue in the Court when it finally granted review.
On July 12, 1967, the Council reconvened, and this time, it modified its
February 4 Order by asking the district court judges to internally agree on a
new division of cases.217 Judge Chandler argued in a memorandum to the
other district court judges that the Council had “illegally” attempted to
“create a situation in which the Council could assert its powers under
28 U.S.C. § 137” because the judges were already in agreement as to the
division of cases, with the exception of Judge Chandler—who was barred
from being assigned new cases.218 The district court judges, including
213. Id. at 83–84. But see id. at 83 n.5 (“We note that nothing in the statute or its legislative
history indicates that Congress intended or anyone considered the Circuit Judicial Councils to be courts
of appeals en banc.”).
214. Id. at 84. The Solicitor General essentially argued that the Court had jurisdiction to rule
on the writ of mandamus filed by Judge Chandler. Id. However, he concluded: “[T]hat even though
there is appellate jurisdiction in this Court, nonetheless it ought not to be exercised since the Order of
December 13 has been superseded for four years by the Order of February 4, the terms of which have
been expressly approved by petitioner.” Id.
215. Id. at 81.
216. Id. Judge Chandler argued:
[H]is acquiescence in the division of new business settled upon by his fellow district judges was
given deliberately for reasons of “strategy” in order to prevent any possibility that the Council
could find that “the district judges are unable to agree upon the adoption of rules of orders” for
the distribution of business and assignment of cases under 28 U.S.C. § 137.
Id.
217. Id. at 81–82 (indicating the reconvening of the Judicial Council).
218. Letter from Stephen Chandler to Clerk’s Office, supra note 195. The Western District
Judges, including Judge Chandler himself, wrote the Judicial Council: “[T]he current order for the
division of business in this district is agreeable under the circumstances.” Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 82.
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Judge Chandler, finally responded to the Council that the division of cases
was “agreeable,” and that it was not necessary to issue another order.219
Judge Chandler, of course, still believed a constitutional impediment to the
Council’s actions remained, and filed an appeal to the Court.220 It took two
years and a new Chief Justice for the Court to decide to grant review.221
II. JUDGE CHANDLER, THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH, AND ETHICS REFORM
On February 15, 1966, Senator Joseph Tydings (a Maryland Democrat
and Chairman of the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary) convened a hearing for the
purpose of determining whether federal judges could be removed only
through the impeachment process, and if so, whether there should be a new
law empowering the judiciary to remove “unfit” judges.222 Senator Fred
Hart (a Michigan Democrat) joined Senator Tydings in the hearing, but the
Committee’s third member, Senator Hugh Scott (a Republican from
Pennsylvania), did not.223 Senator Tydings called the Council’s actions
against Judge Chandler a “charade,” and stated that “[the] Judicial Council’s
abortive action in the Chandler case created havoc in the Western District of
Oklahoma.”224 Senator Tydings listed a number of shortcomings on the
part of the Council, including that the appellate judges failed to give
Judge Chandler notice of the first hearing, provided no evidence to him,
specified no charges against him, and refused to give him an opportunity to
defend himself.225 Although Senator Tydings may have exaggerated the
impact of the Council’s conduct on the district courts, one might agree with
However, Judge Chandler retained his argument that “the Council has usurped the impeachment
power, committed by the Constitution to the Congress exclusively.” Id. While Judge Chandler agreed
that there were some “legitimate administrative purposes” under the statute, they “do not include
stripping a judge of his judicial function as he claims was done here.” Id.
219. Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 88–89.
220. Id. at 75–76.
221. Compare id. at 82 (indicating the Judicial Council met in late September 1967 to reconsider
the need for the February 4th Order to stay), with id. at 74 (noting the date of oral argument before the
Supreme Court was set for December 10, 1969).
222. U.S. S. Judicial Fitness Hearings, supra note 12, pt. I, at 1 (statement of Joseph D. Tydings,
Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach.).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 2. It should be noted that Tydings wanted to make it clear that he did not have
enough evidence to refute an allegation that Judge Chandler was unfit, or that the Council did not rely
on any evidence. See id. at 3 (mentioning the legal issues and facts surrounding the situation between
Judge Chandler and the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit had not yet been determined).
225. Id. at 2.
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him when he accused it of “bringing ridicule” to the federal judiciary.226
Senator Tydings then read Senator Samuel Ervin’s statement into the
record, in which Senator Ervin argued that the Council had acted
unconstitutionally against Judge Chandler, and that Justices Douglas and
Black were correct in their dissents.227
Senator Ervin had also privately defended Judge Chandler against the
Tenth Circuit.228 He admitted to a constituent that he had no personal
knowledge of Judge Chandler, but insisted that the Tenth Circuit had
engaged in unjustified and dangerous actions.229 That a senator issued this
criticism should have caused concern in the Judicial Branch, but it was cause
for greater concern that at the time, Senator Ervin was also a member of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary.230
Finally, one of the witnesses, Joseph Borkin, an attorney who authored a
book titled The Corrupt Judge,231 testified that even if the allegations against
Judge Chandler (regarding his unwillingness to adjudicate cases) were true,
the Council had acted unjustly by failing to provide any evidence to
substantiate the charges.232 Although the Subcommittee hearing evidenced
a complete legislative disagreement with the Council, this did not result in
the Court reconsidering its earlier ruling, or in the Council altering its
February 4 Order. While several other events in fact did open the door to
the Court addressing Judge Chandler’s second petition, the Court’s actions
should be studied with regard to its own internal difficulties.

226. Id. at 2–3.
227. Id. at 5 (statement of Sen. Sam J. Ervin, Jr., as presented by Sen. Joseph D. Tydings,
Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach.).
228. Id. In this speech, Senator Ervin reminded Congress that he had previously come to
Judge Chandler’s defense. See id. pt. II, at 206–07 (statement of Hon. William L. Murray, J. of the
Superior Court of the State of Cal. and response by Sen. Joseph D. Tydings, Chairman, S. Subcomm.
on Improvements in Judicial Mach.) (admitting the rule utilized in the Chandler case had come up in a
private lunch in which it was referred to as an awful provision).
229. Letter from Sam Ervin, U.S. Senator, to Professor Phillip Kurland (Jan. 14, 1966) (on file
with the Library of Congress).
230. See Nominations of Fortas & Thornberry Hearing, supra note 46, at 2 (showing Senator Ervin as
a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee).
231. JOSEPH BORKIN, THE CORRUPT JUDGE (World Publ’g Co. 1966). The full description of
Borkin’s book is The Corrupt Judge: An Inquiry into Bribery and Other High Crimes and Misdemeanors in the
Federal Courts. Id. at iii. The book is not about Judge Chandler. Id. at 300–01.
232. U.S. S. Judicial Fitness Hearings, supra note 12, pt. I, at 71–72 (statement of Joseph Borkin,
esquire).
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In 1969, Justice Abe Fortas resigned from the Supreme Court rather than
face a probable impeachment trial.233 The previous year, during
Justice Fortas’s Chief Justice confirmation hearings, journalists discovered
that he had been paid a large sum of money for serving as an adjunct
professor at the American University Law School.234 The ethics rules
governing federal judges did not prohibit employment as an adjunct
professor, and arguably such employment was consistent with a judge’s duty
to serve as an ambassador of the law.235 Moreover, the students who
studied under a Supreme Court Justice had theoretically benefitted in their
legal education. However, Justice Fortas’s salary was paid through an
endowment created by Louis Wolfson—a convicted financier who
Justice Fortas had previously advised.236 Justice Fortas’s association with
Wolfson alone might not have been cause for an impeachment hearing, but
he also failed to testify accurately to the Senate during his confirmation
hearings regarding his advice to President Johnson on the United States’
involvement in the Vietnam Conflict.237
In addition to accusations against Justice Fortas, on April 15, 1970,
Congressman Gerald Ford—the Republican minority leader in the House
of Representatives—accused Justice Douglas of violating several ethics
rules, as well as undermining United States national security.238 Several of
Congressman Ford’s allegations were not new to the House. Throughout
the 1960s, several legislators, in particular Southern Democrats, had
demanded investigations into Justice Douglas, based on the Justice’s four
marriages as well as his financial relationship to a casino owner.239
However, Congressman Ford also alleged that Justice Douglas’s political
activities—and publication of a book titled Points of Rebellion—proved the

233. Robert Taft, Jr., Statement on the Resignation of Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas
(May 15, 1969) (on file with the Library of Congress) [hereinafter Taft’s Statement on Justice Fortas’
Resignation].
234. BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, FORTAS: THE RISE AND RUIN OF A SUPREME COURT
JUSTICE 142–49 (1988).
235. Cf. id. (outlining the ethical duties of federal judges in regards to Justice Fortas).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See 116 CONG. REC. 11915 (1970) (“But this is only the beginning of the insolence by
which Mr. Justice Douglas has evidently decided to sully the high standards of his profession and defy
the conventions and convictions of decent Americans.”).
239. See Judgment Day for Justice Douglas, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 27, 1970, at 20 (reporting on Mr. Ford’s
proposal to investigate the conduct of Justice Douglas).
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Justice wanted the government toppled.240 The House Judiciary
Committee investigated Congressman Ford’s allegations against Justice
Douglas but found no wrongdoing.241
A. Congress, the Court, and Judicial Ethics Reforms
By the end of 1968, there was a general perception in Congress that the
ethical standards of the federal judiciary were far too malleable. On
February 25, 1969, Senator Ervin referred a draft bill to the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary which would have prohibited federal judges and
magistrates from “engag[ing] or participat[ing] [in] . . . ‘the exercise of any
power, or the discharge of any duty, which is conferred or imposed upon
any officer or employee of the executive branch or the legislative branch of
the government.’”242 Senator Ervin’s Bill sought to prevent judges from
advising a president regarding drafting a non-judicial legislation.243
At the same time, Senator Tydings introduced a bill to create a
“Commission on Judicial Disabilities and Tenure” which would be
composed of five judges and chaired by the chief justice.244 This proposed
Commission would have the power to inquire into the conduct of all federal
judges.245 If four or more of the judges agreed that a federal judge had
violated judicial standards, the Commission would recommend to the
House Judiciary Committee that the judge be subject to impeachment.246
On November 6, 1969, Senator Tydings addressed the Catholic University
Law School on the need for judicial reform in which he claimed that
Congress had to legislate a standard of “good behavior” for the judiciary

240. See 116 CONG. REC. 11914–17 (1970) (contending Justice Douglas’s activities and behavior
while serving on the Supreme Court evidenced seditious intent).
241. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 29 (Princeton Univ. Press ed. 1966) (“Although
Justice Douglas’s life-style, including his four marriages, and much of his decision making provoked
hostile reactions from many Republicans, the impeachment investigation ultimately exposed and
perhaps diffused the personal or partisan motivations for his attempted impeachment.” (citation
omitted)).
242. 115 CONG. REC. 4299 (1969) (quoting S. 1097, 91st Cong. (1969)).
243. See id. at 4298–99 (noting the dangers of allowing the President to appoint judges to
positions in which they would be performing non-judicial duties).
244. Id. at 6218.
245. See id. (stating the commission “would act to retire or remove a judge only after an
investigation and a formal hearing held in accordance with the requirements of due process”).
246. Judicial Disabilities, Tenure and Conflicts of Interests Acts, S. 1516, 91st Cong. § 377,
115 CONG. REC. 6226–27 (1969) (enacted).
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because the judiciary had failed to follow its own standards.247
Senator Tydings cited to Justice Fortas’s resignation, as well as “the
Chandler case,” as his reason to push for new legislation.248 He also
reminded his audience that on June 10, 1969, when Chief Justice Warren
pushed the Judicial Conference to prepare a code of ethics, his efforts
faltered because of “dimming of judicial resolve” by the Supreme Court.249
Senator Tydings, moreover, argued that mandatory reporting of income and
gifts (as well as regulations on judicial activities) were not a threat to the
judiciary’s independence, but rather, that such regulations would serve to
bolster public confidence in the judiciary.250 He concluded: “The threat
will pass only when the members of the federal judiciary realize that not
every attempt to monitor their conduct constitutes ‘hazing’ . . . .”251
On May 8, 1969, then Congressman Robert Alphonso Taft, Jr., the
grandson of Chief Justice and former president William Howard Taft,
introduced H.R. 11109—a Bill that would have required federal judges to
provide to the Comptroller General their complete tax filings (including any
spousal incomes) as well as the names and addresses of professional
corporations, businesses, foundations, or other enterprises in which the
judge served as a compensated officer or consultant.252 The Bill would
247. Joseph D. Tydings, Senator, Address at the Catholic Univ. of Am. (Nov. 6, 1969)
(transcript on file with the Library of Congress).
248. See id. (commenting on the controversies surrounding the Judiciary and how each
controversy “demonstrated anew critical problems of judicial temperament and public disapproval of
undisclosed outside activities of judges and undisclosed financial holdings”).
249. See id. (discussing the Judicial Conference’s move to reform the Judiciary, and the Supreme
Court’s failure to implement reform guidelines imposed on other federal judges on itself).
250. See id. (emphasizing the need for judges to disclose the amount of compensation received
for any “off-the-bench activity”).
251. Id.
252. H.R. 11109, 91st Cong. § 470 (1969); Letter from Robert Taft, Jr., U.S. Representative, to
Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Comm. (May 26, 1969) (on file with the Library of
Congress). Taft wrote:
As you know, on May 8, the Honorable Gerald Ford and I introduced H.R. 11109, to provide for
financial disclosure by members of the Federal judiciary.
In view of recent developments, I feel the Committee should consider whether it would be
appropriate at this time to schedule hearings on this proposal. In making this request, I recognize,
of course, the recent call by the Chief Justice for action by the Judicial Conference, as well as the
constitutional questions involved.
Id. Additionally, Gerald Ford wrote separately to Congressman Celler on May 28, stating: “Honorable
Robert Taft, Jr., and I have introduced H.R. 11109, to provide for financial disclosure by members of
the Federal judiciary. This legislation has been referred to your committee and I would very much

128

ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS

[Vol. 8:90

have also required judges to list their real property, personal property, and
trust interests valued at over $10,000.253 Finally, Congressman Taft’s Bill
required judges to report all financial liabilities (such as home loans and lines
of credit) valued at over $5,000.254 Ostensibly, Congressman Taft’s Bill,
like Senator Ervin’s and Senator Tydings’, was introduced as a means to
build public confidence in the impartiality of federal judges following
Justice Fortas’s resignation.255 On November 4, 1969, Congressman Taft,
along with Congressman Ford, formally requested that Congressman Celler
schedule a hearing on H.R. 11109—particularly because three days earlier,
the Judicial Conference rescinded a rule prohibiting judges from earning
outside income.256 Congressman Celler, however, was non-committal
about when a hearing would be scheduled.257 Congressman Taft’s inability
to move the Bill to a House Judiciary Committee hearing proved frustrating,
and he complained to a University of Cincinnati Law School professor,
explaining that he saw “no reason why a thorough investigation of such
conflicts of interest should not be carried out[,]” adding that
Congressman Ford was in the process of investigating “at least one member
of the Court.”258 Arguably, because of Judge Chandler’s investments and
financial relationships, he would have had to alter his extra-judicial behavior
if any of these Bills became law.
In concert with these legislators, Chief Justice Warren was concerned
with the Justices’ extra-judicial activities and convened a Judicial Conference
to convince the Justices to adopt a more stringent ethics code, mirroring the
code governing the lower federal courts.259 On June 10, 1969, the Judicial

appreciate anything which you may do to schedule hearings on the proposal.” Letter from Gerald
Ford, U.S. Representative, to Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Comm. (May 28, 1969)
(on file with the Library of Congress).
253. H.R. 11109, § 470(b)–(c).
254. Id. § 470(e).
255. See Taft’s Statement on Justice Fortas’ Resignation, supra note 233 (referring to Justice
Fortas’ resignation as “a solution which maintains the integrity of the Court”).
256. Letter from Robert Taft, Jr., U.S. Representative, to Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the
House Judiciary Comm. (Nov. 4, 1969) (on file with the Library of Congress).
257. See Letter from Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Comm., to Robert Taft,
Jr., U.S. Representative (Nov. 7, 1969) (on file with the Library of Congress) (stating the Committee
would address the issue “as soon as [the Committee’s] schedule permits”).
258. Letter from Robert Taft, Jr., U.S. Representative, to C.M. Hulley, Professor (Dec. 5, 1969)
(on file with the Library of Congress).
259. See Fred P. Graham, Justices Rebuff Warren on Code: Most of Colleagues Defer Action on Suggestion
on Ethics Until Fall Term, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1969, at 1 (discussing Justice Warren’s conference

2017]

The Right to an Independent Judiciary

129

Conference issued guidelines to govern the conduct of judges.260 The
Judicial Conference was, in effect, responding to Tydings’ Bill, and, indeed,
matched its guidelines to the proposed Bill.261 The guidelines included the
creation of a judicial board to monitor the income and assets of other
judges.262 Several judges opposed these guidelines, and petitioned Chief
Justice Burger (who had succeeded Chief Justice Warren) to re-evaluate their
efficacy.263 Justice Douglas took the step of explaining to the Justices his
reasons for opposing the Judicial Conference’s new rules.264 He challenged
that judges should have no role in telling each other what to do, and asked
whether the Supreme Court would also be monitored and overseen by
judges in the lower judiciary.265 Any new requirements on judges, he urged,
had to be enacted by Congress.266 It also likely galled Justice Douglas that
judges would now have to first seek the Conference’s approval before
publishing an article, travelling, or accepting compensation for lecturing or
writing.267 He claimed he deplored seeing a cloistered life of the judiciary
and believed a rule requiring judges to submit their literary work or speeches
for review was merely a form of judicial censorship.268
proposal to “formally adopt a standard of judicial conduct similar to that approved . . . by the Judicial
Conference” which “applies only to lower court judges”).
260. See JUD. CONF. U.S., REP. PROCS. SPECIAL MEETING JUD. CONF. U.S. 42–43 (1969)
JUD.
CONF.
U.S.
REP.
(1969)],
available
at
[hereinafter
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/1969-03.pdf [perma.cc/6AVL-R76F] (listing the
resolutions passed at the meeting).
261. See Judicial Reform Act, S. 1506, 91st Cong., 115 CONG. REC. 6220–24 (1969) (enacted)
(proposing guidelines similar to those suggested by Tydings).
262. S. 1510, 91st Cong., 115 CONG. REC. 6225 (1969) (enacted).
263. See, e.g., Letter from John Harlan, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Warren Burger, Chief
Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Mar. 31, 1970) (on file with the Library of Congress) (explaining to the
Chief Justice reasons why actions of the Judicial Conference should be suspended).
264. Memorandum from William Douglas, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to the Judicial
Conference of the U.S. (Aug. 8, 1970) (on file with the Library of Congress).
265. Cf. Douglas Defends Judge’s Rights, LONGVIEW NEWS J. (Texas), Jun. 4, 1970, at 6 (“William
O. Douglas, the Supreme Court’s most controversial justice, has entered an impassioned defense of
the right of federal judges to speak their minds and pursue an independent course.”).
266. See Memorandum from William Douglas to the Judicial Conference of the U.S., supra
note 264 (“[I]t is plainly not in the competence of the judges to write such a law as I said in the Chandler
case.”).
267. Cf. JUD. CONF. U.S. REP. (1969), supra note 260, at 42 (“A judge in regular active service
shall not accept compensation of any kind, whether in the form of loans, gifts, gratuities, honoraria or
otherwise, for services hereafter performed or to be performed . . . .”).
268. See Douglas Defends Judge’s Rights, supra note 265 (“William O. Douglas, the Supreme Court’s
most controversial justice, has entered an impassioned defense of the right of federal judges to speak
their minds and pursue an independent course.”).

130

ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS

[Vol. 8:90

B. House Judiciary Investigation into Judge Chandler and the Judicial Council
On February 22, 1966, Congressman Harold Royce Gross, a Republican
from Iowa, introduced H.R. Res. 739, authorizing and directing the
Committee on the Judiciary “as a whole or by subcommittee, to inquire into
and investigate the official conduct” of Judge Chandler, Judge Murrah, and
Judge Bohanon.269 Congressman Gross did not specifically seek an
impeachment against any of the judges, rather, he drafted H.R. Res. 739 “to
determine whether in the opinion of said committee the said judges or any
of them have been guilty of any high crime or misdemeanor which in the
contemplation of the Constitution requires the interposition of the
constitutional powers of the House.”270 Thus, while Congressman Gross
did not overtly seek impeachment through H.R. Res. 739, its use of the
“high crime or misdemeanor” standard contemplated impeachment as a
possibility—even though it did not propose whether Judge Chandler,
Judge Murrah, or Judge Bohanon should be the investigation’s greater
focus.271
Impeachment is a different matter than an investigation into judicial
conduct.272 Impeachment processes begin at the Judiciary Committee, and
then, if articles of impeachment are drafted, these are provided to the full
House.273 If the full House approves the articles by a majority vote, the
articles transition into the Senate for an impeachment trial.274
269. H.R. Res. 739, 89th Cong. (1966) (enacted). It is difficult to discern Gross’s connection
to this particular investigation: he was not appointed to the Judiciary Committee, he did not appear to
have a connection to any of the parties, and his state (Iowa) resided on the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit. See generally David W. Schwieder & Dorothy Schwieder, The Power of Prickliness: Iowa’s
H.R. Gross in the U.S. House of Representatives, 65 ANNALS IOWA 329 (2006) (presenting biographical
details on Harold R. Gross). However, he had a reputation for being a conservative Republican, often
at odds with his own party. See BILL KAUFFMAN, AIN’T MY AMERICA: THE LONG NOBLE HISTORY
OF ANTIWAR CONSERVATISM 124 (1st ed. 2008) (showing that Gross voted against the Marshall Plan,
the space program, and military spending, often against the Eisenhower and Nixon Administrations);
see also Schwieder & Schwieder, supra, at 334 (“Not surprisingly, party leaders opposed Gross’s
candidacy.”). As an exasperated Gerald Ford once quipped, “[t]here are three parties in the House:
Democrats, Republicans, and H. R. Gross.” Id. at 358.
270. H.R. Res. 739, 89th Cong. (1966) (enacted).
271. See id. (outlining the high crimes and misdemeanors standard for determining whether the
House is in a position to exercise its constitutional powers).
272. See, e.g., GERHARDT, supra note 241, at 26 (distinguishing between the impeachment
process and an investigation into judicial misconduct).
273. See id. (detailing the impeachment process).
274. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (assigning the power of impeachment solely to the House
of Representatives); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (delegating the power to try all impeachments solely
to the Senate).
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Constitutionally, a single member of the House may initiate an impeachment
vote against a president, vice president, or executive officer whose position
occurred as a result of the Senate confirmation process.275 The
Constitution requires two-thirds of the senators present to concur on the
individual’s removal from office.276 The operative basis for impeachment,
as noted, is the commission of “high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”277
Fifteen federal judges, since the Nation’s founding, have been impeached,
and only eight of them have been convicted and removed.278
On receipt of Congressman Gross’s request, Congressman Celler
consulted with Congressman Howard W. Smith, the Chairman of the Rules
Committee, before forming a subcommittee under H.R. Res. 739 to
investigate Judge Chandler, Judge Murrah, and Judge Bohanon.279 The
reason for Congressman Celler’s consultation related to the unusual nature
of H.R. Res. 739, which did not directly call for impeachment.280 Given
the language of H.R. Res. 739, the investigation may have had no choice but
to adopt the standards associated with impeachment.281 As Chairman of
the House Judiciary Committee, Congressman Celler had the authority to
appoint two other congressmen.282 To this end, he selected Jack Brooks
of Texas, and William St. Onge of Connecticut.283 Congressman William

275. See, e.g., III ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 2342, 2400, 2469 (1907) (“The impeachment . . . was
set in motion on the responsibility of one [m]ember of the House . . . .”).
276. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (requiring two-thirds of the members of the Senate to be
present to render a conviction in an impeachment proceeding).
277. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
278. U.S. S. Judicial Fitness Hearings, supra note 12, pt. I, at 55 (statement of Joseph Borkin,
esquire).
279. Letter from Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Comm., to Howard W.
Smith, Chairman of the House Rules Comm. (Feb. 23, 1966) (on file with the Library of Congress);
Letter from Emanuel Celler to Jack Brooks, supra note 94.
280. Cf. H.R. Res. 739, 89th Cong. (1966) (enacted) (calling for findings and resolutions of
impeachment); Letter from Emanuel Celler to Jack Brooks, supra note 94 (suggesting Mr. Brooks
consult additional information regarding H.R. Res. 739).
281. See H.R. Res. 739 (“Said committee shall report its findings to the House, together with
such resolutions of impeachment or other recommendations as it deems proper.”).
282. See Letter from Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Comm., to William St.
Onge (Feb. 23, 1966) (on file with the Library of Congress) (advising St. Onge that he had appointed
members of the subcommittee); Letter from Emanuel Celler to Jack Brooks, supra note 94 (asking
Brooks to chair the Ad Hoc Special Subcommittee).
283. Letter from Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Comm., to H.R. Gross, U.S.
Representative (Feb. 23, 1966) (on file with the Library of Congress).
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McCulloch (the ranking Republican on the Judiciary Committee) appointed
Congressman Richard Poff of Virginia.284
All three of the congressmen were lawyers.285 Brooks was born in 1922,
served in the Marine Corps in World War II, and graduated from the
University of Texas School of Law in 1949.286 He was first elected to
Congress in 1953, and he served for four decades.287 St. Onge was born in
1914, served in the Army during World War II, and (after the war) graduated
from the University of Connecticut’s School of Law.288 He had been
appointed as a prosecutor and municipal judge, and was then elected Mayor
of Putnam Township before his election to Congress in 1962.289 Like
Brooks and St. Onge, Poff was a World War II veteran.290 He graduated
from the University of Virginia’s School of Law and was elected to Congress
at the age of twenty-nine.291 In 1970 (after the failed nominations of
Clement Haynsworth and G. Harrold Carswell to the Supreme Court),
President Richard Nixon considered nominating Congressman Poff to the
Court—but Congressman Poff asked him to withdraw his name from
consideration.292
On April 30, 1968, the H.R. Res. 739 subcommittee issued its final
report—concluding that all three of the judges “brought discredit” to
themselves and had “demeaned [the] administration of justice in their
courts.”293 The investigation found fault in each judge, but it specifically
noted the Tenth Circuit Judicial Council’s lack of discretion in dealing with
284. Id.
285. See LAURA KALMAN, THE LONG REACH OF THE SIXTIES: LBJ, NIXON, AND THE
MAKING OF THE CONTEMPORARY SUPREME COURT 259 (2017) (stating Poff graduated from the
University of Virginia School of Law); Douglas Martin, Jack Brooks, Former Texas Congressman, Dies at
89, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/06/us/politics/jack-brooksformer-texas-congressman-dies-at-89.html [perma.cc/A42E-LQTF] (stating Congressman Brooks
studied law at the University of Texas); St. Onge, William Leon, (1914-1970), BIOGRAPHICAL
DIRECTORY U.S. CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=S000769
[perma.cc/4NAS-4WUU] (acknowledging St. Onge “was admitted to the bar in 1948 . . . [and]
commenced the practice of law in Putnam”).
286. Martin, supra note 285.
287. Id.
288. St. Onge, William Leon, supra note 285.
289. William St. Onge of Connecticut, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1970, at 33.
290. EARL JOHNSON, TO ESTABLISH JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF CIVIL
LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES 226 (2014).
291. Id.
292. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS POWELL JR. 3 (Maxwell Macmillian Int’l ed. 1994);
KALMAN, supra note 285, at 259–65.
293. West, supra note 11, at 13 (citation omitted).
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Judge Chandler.294 The report concluded by criticizing how the judges let
themselves become embroiled in undignified “personal and political
rivalries.”295 Ultimately, the House Judiciary Committee concluded there
was insufficient evidence for impeachment.296
Although the report, for a variety of reasons, might have made for
salacious reading based on Judge Chandler’s personal history, the most
important aspect of it had to do with its conclusion regarding the
constitutionality of the Council’s action in removing cases from
Judge Chandler. It declared the attempt to squelch Judge Chandler was
“completely beyond the legal authority of the Council . . . . Congress has
never authorized circuit judges to inquire into the fitness of a district judge
to hold his office and to remove him if they so determine.”297 Thus, the
subcommittee issued its definitive answer to the Council’s removal of
Judge Chandler from adjudicating cases: its action was unconstitutional.298
Equally important is the difference between the House investigation and the
Senate investigation—the House investigation was convened to examine the
conduct of these specific judges and not to examine whether new laws were
required for judicial governance.299
Perhaps less significant to the Supreme Court (and not in the public’s
general knowledge) was that other prominent legislators outside of the
House Judiciary Committee took an interest in Judge Chandler, and indeed,
sided with him. For instance, Judge Chandler himself questioned the
Assistant Attorney General as to why the Justice Department had not
assigned a federal prosecutor to represent him against O’Bryan and the local
district attorney, or to appoint him counsel when he argued his cause before
the Court.300 Further, because on two occasions Justices Black and
294. Id. at 13–14 (citation omitted).
295. Id. at 13 (citation omitted).
296. Id. (citation omitted).
297. Id. at 13–14 (citations omitted); see also Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 137 (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(“[T]here is no power under our Constitution for one group of federal judges to censor or discipline
any federal judge and no power to declare him inefficient and strip him of his power to act as a judge.”).
298. See West, supra note 11, at 13–14 (citation omitted) (pronouncing the action against
Judge Chandler “forbidden by the Constitution”).
299. Compare H.R. Res. 739, 89th Cong. (1966) (enacted) (requesting specific examination of
Judge Chandler, Judge Murrah, and Judge Bohanon), with Shipley, supra note 14, at 178 (analyzing
Tydings’ efforts to reform the Judiciary by commencing an investigation into “the availability of and
need for procedures to govern removal, retirement, and disciplining of unfit Federal judges” (quoting
U.S. S. Judicial Fitness Hearings, supra note 12, pt. I, at 1)).
300. Letter from Stephen Chandler, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Okla., to
John Douglas, Assistant U.S. Attorney General (Mar. 4, 1966) (on file with the Library of Congress).
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Douglas sided with Judge Chandler in his appeals,301 it might have
surprised them that Judge Chandler was never accused of corruption by the
Republican Senator John J. Williams.302 Senator Williams publicly called
for Justice Douglas’ resignation throughout his career,303 and was known
as “The Conscience of the Senate,” for investigating corruption in
government.304 In doing so, Senator Williams sometimes communicated
with Chicago entrepreneur E.L. Albright.305 It was Albright who provided
Senator Williams with derogatory information on both Justice Douglas and
Judge William Campbell (of the Northern District of Illinois) over their
relationship to Albert Parvin, a Las Vegas casino owner who funded a
foundation designed to promote democracy in Latin America.306
Evidently, it was true that Justice Douglas received a yearly stipend from
Parvin’s foundation.307 Consequently, during his communication with
301. See Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 129–41 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with
whom Mr. Justice BLACK concurs, dissenting.”); Chandler I, 382 U.S. at 1004–06 (Black, J., dissenting)
(showing Justice Black’s disagreement with the Judicial Council’s Order issued against Judge Chandler,
and that Justice Douglas sided with Justice Black).
302. Williams was also known as the “Sherlock Holmes of Capitol Hill.” John J. Williams,
SPARTACUS EDUC., http://spartacus-educational.com/JFKwilliamsJ.htm [perma.cc/FZ58-TLYZ].
His “Sherlock” antics attributed to an effort to unseat Justice Douglas. CAROL E. HOFFECKER,
HONEST JOHN WILLIAMS: U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE 224 (2000). Ultimately, although Senator
Williams found distaste in Justice Douglas’ behavior, he never accused Judge Chandler of any sort of
corruption. Cf. Jim Lichtman, The Conscience of the Senate, IT’S ETHICS, STUPID! (July 30, 2008),
https://ethicsstupid.com/personalities/the-conscience-of-the-senate/
[perma.cc/2V8N-VMKY]
(“[Williams] always informed the subject of an investigation of his findings personally before he
announced them publicly, and never once in twenty-four years did he falsely accuse anyone.”).
303. HOFFECKER, supra note 302, at 224.
304. Lichtman, supra note 302.
305. See, e.g., Letter from E.J. Albright to John Williams, U.S. Senator (Jan. 5, 1966) (on file with
the Library of Congress) [hereinafter January 5th Letter from Albright to Williams] (expounding on
the unsavory behavior of Justice Douglas and Judge William Campbell—a federal district judge).
306. January 5th Letter from Albright to Williams, supra note 305; Letter from E.J. Albright to
John Williams, U.S. Senator (Jan. 7, 1966) (on file with the Library of Congress) [hereinafter January
7th letter from Albright to Williams].
307. See F.B.I. Kept Close Watch on Douglas, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1984,
http://www.nytimes.com/1984/07/22 [perma.cc/H67X-LDY5] (reporting on the investigations into
connections between Douglas and organized crime related to gambling); Fred Barbash, Justice Douglas’
Memoirs, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 1980, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/
1980/09/11/justice-douglas-memoirs/7c3f55c5-bed8-4359-8a9a-5306bbdfee93/?utm_term=.47eef1
6ba70f [perma.cc/KH8J-MWGY] (highlighting Justice Douglas’ speculation that the “news stories
about his receipt of a salary from the Parvin Foundation” was an attempt to “tie him in” with Parvin’s
gambling concessions); Judgment Day for Justice Douglas, supra note 239 (“Most recently, there has been
some evidence that [Justice Douglas] performed legal work for the private Parvin Foundation in
violation of the rules of his office (in addition to collecting a $20,000 annual fee from it) . . . .”).
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Senator Williams, Albright suggests it was Judge Chandler who informed
him that “hoodlum[s]” in Chicago boasted of making payoffs to “certain
members of the U.S. Supreme Court.”308
III. JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS AND DECISION
As discussed above, by 1970, three independent efforts for judicial
reform—one in the House, one in the Senate, and one within the federal
judiciary itself—were underway.309 These efforts contextualize the
Supreme Court’s approach to Chandler II, particularly in light of the
majority’s failure to note any legislative action regarding Judge Chandler in
its opinion.310 On December 10, 1969, the Court heard argument on
Judge Chandler’s new appeal, but it was not until June 1, 1970, that the
Justices issued their decision.311 Befittingly, not long after the decision’s
publication, Judge Chandler filed a statement saying that he refused to
disclose his personal assets to the Conference despite the new disclosure
rule, and argued that only Congress had the authority to force him to do
so.312 Eight days after oral arguments on Chandler II, a news report issued
announcing that the House Judiciary Committee had issued a confidential
report criticizing the Judicial Council for exceeding its authority.313 The
paper also recognized that the House Committee was sharply critical of
Judge Chandler and his colleagues for engaging in personal and political
rivalries “that have ‘brought discredit on [their] courts.’”314

308. Cf. January 7th Letter from Albright to Williams, supra note 306 (“As Judge Stephens
Chandler told me some time ago . . . .”).
309. See supra Part II (outlining the different independent efforts for judicial reform underway).
310. See generally Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 77–89 (failing to consider legislative action regarding
Judge Chandler in the majority opinion).
311. Id. at 74.
312. Stephen Chandler, Statement Regarding Filing of Financial Report Required by Judicial
Conference of the U.S. (1970) (on file with the Library of Congress). After arguing that only Congress
could place such requirements on judges, Judge Chandler added:
It is not a proper judicial function for one judge or body of judges to lay down personal rules of
conduct for other judges. I am not curious about the financial affairs of other judges. Their
conduct is none of my personal or official business nor is it the proper business of any other
judge or body of judges.
Id. News media reported Judge Chandler’s refusal, but this did not alter the Court’s decision. See, e.g.,
Judge Cites His Reasons for Refusal, OKLA. CITY TIMES, Aug. 7, 1970, at 10 (providing an account of
Judge Chandler’s refusal to comply with financial disclosure requests).
313. MacKenzie, supra note 18, at 12-A.
314. Id.
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In a new brief, Judge Chandler argued to the Court that all of the
Council’s orders relating to him placed conditions on the exercise of his
constitutional power as a judge, and that in issuing these orders, the Council
usurped Congress’ impeachment power and undermined judicial
independence.315 He conceded that the Council was statutorily vested with
administrative authorities, but argued that the stripping of any judicial
functions was a constitutional act, and therefore exceeded any
administrative authority.316 Judge Chandler’s argument essentially aligned
with the House Judiciary Committee’s conclusions.317 The Council argued
that the Court lacked jurisdiction because in issuing the Orders against
Judge Chandler it had acted in an administrative, rather than judicial,
capacity.318 The Council’s arguments rested on the assumption that
because Congress had not authorized judicial review when it enacted the
statutes creating the Judicial Conference and judicial councils, the Court
could not exercise jurisdiction over its administrative positions, unless
Judge Chandler had been removed from all judicial duties.319 Solicitor
General Erwin Griswold (Marshall’s successor) argued in an amicus brief
that because the Council had acted in an en banc capacity, any appeal had
to be considered through the All Writs Act, and that Judge Chandler’s
complaint merited a review—even under the high standards of the Act.320
However, Griswold ended with the argument that Chief Justice Burger
would parrot, namely, that Judge Chandler had rendered his appeal to the
Court moot because he had acquiesced to the Council’s final Order.321
A. The Court’s Deliberations
On March 27, 1970, Chief Justice Burger circulated his first draft to the
Justices with the caveat that he wanted to dispose of the appeal “on the
narrowest basis [he saw] as valid.”322 Chief Justice Burger’s first draft
315. Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 82–83.
316. See id. (“[P]etitioner contends that the legitimate administrative purposes to which it may
be turned do not include stripping a judge of his judicial functions as he claims was done here.”).
317. Compare West, supra note 11, at 13–14 (discussing the Commission on the Judiciary
Committee report which found only Congress had impeachment authority over judges), with Chandler
II, 398 U.S. at 80 (looking to Judge Chandler’s brief which suggested the same).
318. Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 83.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 83–84.
321. Id. at 84.
322. Memorandum from Warren Burger, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to the U.S.
Supreme Court (Mar. 27, 1970) (on file with the Library of Congress).
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contained a scant, one paragraph legal analysis, in which he concluded that
only if the Council had acted in a judicial capacity could the Court review
Judge Chandler’s appeal “without doing violence to the constitutional
requirement that such review be appellate.”323 Essentially, this meant that
Chief Justice Burger agreed with the Council’s determination that (unlike
judicial decisions) a Council’s administrative acts were not subject to
appellate review.324 Yet, Chief Justice Burger believed there was a
secondary basis to deny Judge Chandler an appeal.325 He opined that even
if the Council had engaged in a judicial act, Judge Chandler made an express
agreement to the February 4 Order, and therefore, any case or controversy
had been eliminated by Judge Chandler himself.326 But this conclusion
ignored Judge Chandler’s reasonable argument that he had not acquiesced
to the Council’s February 4 Order,327 and that the House subcommittee
investigation had sided with Judge Chandler and against the Council.328
Regardless, on March 30, Justice White informed Chief Justice Burger that
he would join in his opinion without seeking any modification.329
Although Justice Brennan agreed with Chief Justice Burger’s conclusions,
he took issue with the statement that Judge Chandler had acquiesced to the
February 4 Order.330 He discerned that Judge Chandler’s agreement with
the February 4 Order was not “express”—as both the Council and the
Solicitor General had characterized it—but rather that Judge Chandler only
agreed with the limited purpose of preventing the Council from acting under
28 U.S.C. § 137.331 To Justice Brennan, this proved that Judge Chandler’s
323. Warren Burger, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Unpublished Draft Opinion (Mar. 27,
1970), in Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the U.S., 398 U.S. 74 (1970) (on file with
the Library of Congress) [hereinafter Burger, March 27 Unpublished Draft Opinion].
324. See id. (“If the challenged action of the Judicial Council was a judicial act or decision by a
judicial tribunal, then perhaps it could be reviewed by this Court without doing violence to the
constitutional requirement that such review be appellate.”).
325. See id. (commenting on a missing requirement of “case or controversy”).
326. Id.
327. See Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 90 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“Judge Chandler immediately
responded that he did not in any way concede the Council’s power to enter the February 4 Order, and
that his indication of acquiescence made to the Council did not constitute such a concession.”).
328. See West, supra note 11, at 13–14 (discussing the House subcommittee’s report which
found the Council’s actions forbidden by the Constitution).
329. Cf. Letter from Byron White, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Warren Burger, Chief Justice,
U.S. Supreme Court (Mar. 30, 1970) (on file with the Library of Congress) (requesting the Chief Justice
to join Justice White in the opinion).
330. Letter from William Brennan, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Warren Burger, Chief
Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Apr. 1, 1970) (on file with the Library of Congress).
331. Id.
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agreement with the Order did not “eliminate[] whatever case or controversy
theretofore existed.”332 Justice Brennan added that Judge Chandler’s
“tenacity in pursuing his case here for several years seems quite inconsistent
with any conduct indicating acquiescence.”333 Nonetheless, like Chief
Justice Burger, Justice Brennan wanted the decision to maintain the
principle that the Court could not review the Council’s administrative
decisions, and he remained willing to join with Chief Justice Burger as to the
ultimate conclusion of the appeal.334
On May 15, Chief Justice Burger circulated another draft and, for the first
time, emphasized that Judge Chandler had been a defendant in suits
involving both civil and criminal matters.335 While Chief Justice Burger’s
reasoning is absent from the papers of the other Justices, it may have been
the case that he wanted to assure the legal academy that the Council had
Chief Justice Burger also conceded that
acted reasonably.336
Judge Chandler may have believed he had not acquiesced to the Council’s
Orders, but the opinion still maintained that Judge Chandler had in fact
done so through his actions.337 On May 19, 1970, Chief Justice Burger
circulated another draft opinion, which contained only stylistic alterations
from the May 15 draft.338 A few days later, Justice Brennan informed Chief
Justice Burger that he would join in the opinion.339 At that point, Chief

332. Id. (quoting Burger, March 27 Unpublished Draft Opinion, supra note 323).
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Warren Burger, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Unpublished Draft Opinion (May 15,
1970), in Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the U.S., 398 U.S. 74 (1970) (on file with
the Library of Congress) [hereinafter Burger, May 15 Unpublished Draft Opinion].
336. Cf. Hugo Black, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Unpublished Draft Dissent (1970), in
Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the U.S., 398 U.S.’ 74 (1970) (on file with the
Library of Congress) [hereinafter Black, Unpublished Draft Dissent] (responding to Chief Justice
Burger’s draft opinion, and asserting that the mention of the two suits was irrelevant since the criminal
complaint had been quashed and the civil suit arose from a defendant in a criminal case who charged
Judge Chandler with malicious prosecution and sought compensation). This suit likewise was
dismissed. Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 89.
337. Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 86–87.
338. Compare Burger, May 15 Unpublished Draft Opinion, supra note 335 (noting the language
and format), with Warren Burger, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Unpublished Draft Opinion
(May 19, 1970), in Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the U.S., 398 U.S. 74 (1970) (on
file with the Library of Congress) (including almost identical language and format to the May 15 draft).
339. Letter from William Brennan to Warren Burger, supra note 330.
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Justice Burger only needed three other justices to join with him since Justice
Marshall had recused himself, and Justice Fortas had resigned.340
In December of 1969, Justice Douglas conveyed his draft dissent to
Justice Black who informed him that he intended to join in it, but suggested
modifying some of Justice Douglas’ strident language.341 Justice Black also
told Justice Douglas that while he would join in the dissent, he intended to
separately dissent as well.342 Justice Black’s original dissent, written in
pencil, is almost verbatim to his published dissent.343 Justice Black
designed his dissent as a defense of Justice Douglas, rather than attack on
the majority.344
Justice Douglas’ dissent characterized Judge Chandler’s appeal as one of
the “liveliest, most controversial contest[s] involving a federal judge in
modern United States history.”345 It is clear—whether Justice Douglas
intended to use his dissent as an attack on the various efforts to amend the
code of judicial ethics as well as to defend against attacks on himself—that
the dissent carried strong language against any encroachment into judicial
independence.346
340. See Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 88 (“Mr. Justice MARSHALL took no part in the consideration
or decision of this case.”); Taft’s Statement on Justice Fortas’ Resignation, supra note 233 (noting
Justice Fortas had resigned from the Court).
341. Letter from William Douglas, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Hugo Black, Justice, U.S.
Supreme Court (Dec. 31, 1969) (on file with the Library of Congress); see also Memorandum from Hugo
Black, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court (Jan. 5, 1970) (on file
with the Library of Congress) [hereinafter Memorandum from Black to Justices]; William Douglas,
Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Unpublished Draft Dissent (Dec. 1969), in Chandler v. Judicial Council
of the Tenth Circuit of the U.S., 398 U.S. 74 (1970) (on file with the Library of Congress) (noting
Justice Black’s hand-written notes on Justice Douglas’s draft dissent indicated approval).
342. Memorandum from Black to Justices, supra note 341.
343. Compare Black, Unpublished Draft Dissent, supra note 336 (setting forth an opinion almost
exactly the same to the one Justice Black authored in Chandler II), with Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 141–43
(Black, J., dissenting) (exhibiting the same language as Justice Black’s earlier penciled dissent).
344. See Black, Unpublished Draft Dissent, supra note 336 (indicating the dissent is a defense of
Justice Douglas’ opinion).
345. Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 130 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
346. See, e.g., id. at 136–37 (“An independent judiciary is one of this Nation’s outstanding
characteristics. Once a federal judge is confirmed by the Senate and takes his oath, he is independent
of every other judge.”). Justice Douglas specifically wrote:
The mood of some federal judges is opposed to this view and they are active in attempting to
make all federal judges walk in some uniform step. What has happened to petitioner is not a rare
instance; it has happened to other federal judges who have had perhaps a more libertarian
approach to the Bill of Rights than their brethren. The result is that the nonconformist has
suffered greatly at the hands of his fellow judges.
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B. The Decision
Chief Justice Burger began his published decision with a brief but
incomplete history of Judge Chandler’s appeal.347 For instance, nowhere
in the majority opinion was there a mention of the House Judiciary
Committee’s inquiry into Judge Chandler, Judge Murrah, and
Judge Bohanon’s conduct.348 Instead, Chief Justice Burger noted simply
that in December 1965, the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit convened
a special session and issued an order—and this description, he felt,
adequately detailed the “long history of controversy between
[Judge Chandler] and the Council.”349 After this brief description of the
story between Judge Chandler and the Judicial Council, Chief Justice Burger
then moved to the question of whether the Council had diminished
Judge Chandler’s constitutional powers.350 Chief Justice Burger recognized
Judge Chandler’s allegation that the Council effectively stripped him of his
judicial authority, but also wrote that the Council countered by arguing that
it had merely undertaken an administrative prerogative granted by
Congress.351 Chief Justice Burger also acknowledged Judge Chandler’s
argument that the Council usurped Congress’ impeachment authority
through its March 27 Order removing him from further cases.352
He then turned to the constitutional nature of the issue, that is, whether
the actions of the Council had negatively impacted the judicial independence
of the federal trial judges in the Western District of Oklahoma.353 He made
Id. at 137. He also coined: “All power is heady thing as evidenced by the increasing efforts of groups
of federal judges to act as referees over other federal judges.” Id.
347. Id. at 75–82 (majority opinion).
348. See generally id. (failing to mention the investigation that spawned from H.R. Res. 739).
349. Id. at 77. Chief Justice Burger also placed 28 U.S.C. § 332—the operative statute
establishing judicial councils—into a footnote, and noted that the Council based its authority on this
decision. Id. at 76 n.1.
350. Id. at 75–82, 84.
351. Id. at 82–83. In addition to recognizing the Council’s primary argument, Chief
Justice Burger also noted that the Council effectively urged the Court to find that the controversy no
longer existed because Judge Chandler and the other district court judges had agreed to the division of
judicial labor in the district. Id. at 84.
352. Id. at 82.
353. Id. at 84. Here, Chief Justice Burger noted:
Whether the action taken by the Council with respect to the division of business in
Judge Chandler’s district falls to one side or the other of the line defining the maximum
permissible intervention consistent with the constitutional requirement of judicial independence
is the ultimate question on which review is sought in the petition now before us.
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it clear that the majority recognized that judicial independence was a
hallmark of democracy.354 However, having recognized the importance of
the constitutional question at hand, he then turned to the reason the Court
would not grant review of the actual question involved.355 A writ of
mandamus, or prohibition such as Judge Chandler had sought, could only
be granted by the Court if the writ was issued “in aid of [the Court’s]
jurisdiction.”356 Because Judge Chandler had acquiesced to the Council’s
February 4 Order, Chief Justice Burger reasoned that he could not seek
relief in the Court.357 Instead, Chief Justice Burger determined that
Judge Chandler would first have had to seek relief in the Council—in order
to present a true case or controversy—and, that at the time the Court
reviewed Judge Chandler’s appeal, no justiciable case or controversy
existed.358
In short, Chief Justice Burger led the majority of the Court to find that
because the Council had acted within its administrative authority, and
Judge Chandler had either acquiesced to this authority or had not sought a
further remedy through the Council, no constitutional dispute between the

Id.
354. Id. The Court specifically held:
There can, of course, be no disagreement among us as to the imperative need for total and
absolute independence of judges in deciding cases or in any phase of the decisional function. But
it is quite another matter to say that each judge in a complex system shall be the absolute ruler of
his manner of conducting judicial business.
Id.
355. Id. at 86. Under the “All Writs Act,” 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), the Court had to determine
whether to grant a writ in light of an aid to its own jurisdiction. Id. at 86 (citing Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. 137, 173–80 (1803)). The specific wording of the Act is: “The Supreme Court and all courts
established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” Id. at 76 n.2 (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651(a) (1988)). One might conclude that Judge Chandler’s appeal clearly fell within the plain
language of this Act because his allegation against the Judicial Council was that it interfered with the
independence of the district courts to the detriment of not only of the Judge, but also the principle of
separation of powers, as well as the right to an impartial trial judge. See id. at 84 (delineating aspects of
the reasoning behind Judge Chandler’s appeal). Moreover, it was highly probable after the Council
issued its Order that one appeal to the Supreme Court would originate in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma—or at least within one of the other districts within the
Tenth Circuit. Cf. id. at 86 (referring to a challenged Judicial Council action, and suggesting, “perhaps
it could be reviewed by this Court”).
356. Id. at 86 (quoting Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 582 (1943)).
357. Id. at 87–89.
358. Id.
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district court and the Council existed.359 Although Chief Justice Burger did
not overtly apply an exhaustion of administrative remedies test to the
decision, it can be inferred that he adopted the basic tenets of this test by
implication.360 To this end, Chief Justice Burger finished the decision by
acknowledging that Judge Chandler could, in the future and under narrow
circumstances, refile an appeal for a writ of mandamus or prohibition
against the Council.361
Justice Harlan concurred with the result, but chastised the majority for
acknowledging that the first question in Judge Chandler’s appeal was one of
jurisdiction, yet failing to answer whether jurisdiction existed.362 The
central question, Justice Harlan believed, was whether the Council’s actions
were administrative; that is, whether the actions fell outside of Article III
review, or whether they were judicial and therefore subject to appellate
review.363 He conceded in the middle of his concurrence that while several
of the roles Congress provided for the Council to undertake (such as
appointing and firing clerks, designing process forms and court seals, or
designating court times) were “trivial” and, therefore, unlikely to be
reviewable in an Article III court, none of these “trivial” duties had an effect
on the independence of trial judges.364 But he maintained that the Council’s
actions presented an issue of constitutional dimension.365 Further, Justice
Harlan pointed out that Congress had never addressed the question of
whether the actions of the councils were exempted from the All Writs
Act.366
To Justice Harlan, there were three aspects of Judge Chandler’s appeal
that required the Court to rule. First, whether the actions of the Council
presented a case or controversy.367 Second, whether the Court had
359. Id.
360. See generally Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50–51 (1938) (“[N]o one
is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative
remedy has been exhausted.”). See also LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION 424–58 (1965) (laying out the basic tenants of the test for exhaustion of administrative
remedies).
361. See Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 89 (implying the Court could not review Judge Chandler’s appeal
plainly because he did “not ma[k]e a case for the extraordinary relief of mandamus or prohibition”
(emphasis added)).
362. Id. at 89–90 (Harlan, J., concurring).
363. Id. at 95.
364. Id. at 110–11.
365. Id. at 111.
366. Id. at 112.
367. Id. at 89.
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jurisdiction.368 Finally, whether the Judicial Council had acted within its
statutory authority.369 Regardless of whether Judge Chandler was
pressured to acquiesce to the Council’s February 4 Order or whether he
volunteered to accept the February 4 Order, Justice Harlan pointed out that
the Court still had an independent duty to assess whether the Council had
acted within its constitutional and statutory authority.370 Moreover,
Justice Harlan disagreed with the majority’s belief that Judge Chandler had
to renounce his acquiescence to the Council in order to prove that a
controversy still existed.371 He further criticized the majority for suggesting
that a district court could review the Council’s decisions since the decisions
were purely administrative.372
Justice Harlan next turned to the question of the Court’s jurisdiction to
hear Judge Chandler’s appeal. After reviewing the legislative intent
underlying the creation of the councils, he determined that the Court did
affirmatively possess jurisdiction.373 He reasoned that because the judicial
councils were statutorily created, partly to ensure judicial efficiency in the
district courts, this meant that the councils had the ability to participate in
the “management of the judicial work of the circuit.”374 In other words,
the councils possessed a supervisory role over the district courts, and in the
event an order was issued from a council (such as the Orders issued to
Judge Chandler as well as the other judges in the Western District of
Oklahoma), the Orders necessarily affected the litigation in the district
368. Id. at 95.
369. Id. at 111.
370. Id. at 90–92.
371. Id. at 91–92. Justice Harlan specifically criticized the majority for stretching Rescue Army v.
Municipal Court of Los Angeles and concluding that Judge Chandler’s failure to seek an administrative
remedy deprived the Court of jurisdiction. Id. at 92–93 (citing Rescue Army v. Mun. Court of L.A.,
331 U.S. 549 (1947)). Rescue Army arose from a challenge against a municipal ordinance prohibiting
“door to door” solicitations for charity. Rescue Army, 331 U.S. at 550. The California Supreme Court
determined, somewhat ambiguously, that although it would not issue a writ of prohibition against Los
Angeles’ enforcement of the ordinance, the plaintiffs still had a route to challenge the ordinance
through a trial in case the plaintiffs were convicted. Id. at 579. Additionally, the plaintiffs had twice
been convicted in municipal court, but the superior court had reversed the convictions. Id. at 553.
Because Rescue Army arose from a state enforcement action and the plaintiff had another trial pending
with the possibility of full state appellate review, one might conclude that Justice Harlan’s criticism of
the majority appears justified. See generally id. (“As in [Judge Chandler’s] case, the Court’s action had
the effect of rejecting the appellant’s claim of a right to obtain relief without further proceedings in a
lower tribunal[.]” (quoting Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 93 (Harlan, J., concurring))).
372. Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 93–94 (Harlan, J., concurring).
373. Id. at 103–05.
374. Id. at 98.
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courts.375 To Justice Harlan, this meant that the Orders were judicial, not
administrative, and therefore, the Court possessed jurisdiction under the All
Writs Act to review orders, such as the March 27 Order issued by the
Council to Judge Chandler.376
Justice Harlan next assessed whether the Council had acted lawfully. He
conceded that the March 27 Order was problematic, but because the
Council superseded its March 27 Order in its February 4 Order, and because
this second Order was purely administrative (he coined it as “an effort to
move along judicial traffic in the District Court”), no constitutional
infirmity, such as the removal of a judge short of impeachment, arose from
it.377 Justice Harlan cited United States v. Malmin,378 a 1921 decision, for the
proposition that courts of appeals have the administrative authority to
ensure the continual movement of cases through the district courts.379 In
Malmin, the governor general of the United States Virgin Islands removed a
duly appointed federal judge and appointed a new judge without Senate
confirmation.380 The Third Circuit ordered the dismissed judge to return
to his judicial duties because the governor general had acted without
authority.381 Justice Harlan, however, concluded that the Judicial Council’s
February 4 Order, unlike the governor general’s in Malmin, placed a
requirement on Judge Chandler only to certify that he was able to conduct
further trials, and that therefore no permanent bar existed.382
Finally, Justice Harlan found it dispositive that the Council’s February 4
Order comported with the legislative intent underlying 28 U.S.C. § 332, and
found it unnecessary to address the Council’s secondary argument that it
had also complied with 28 U.S.C. § 137.383 Notwithstanding Justice
Harlan’s comprehensive analysis of the majority, he too seems to have
missed a critical point in the history of Judge Chandler’s appeal. Despite
one’s feelings about Judge Chandler’s dubious conduct, one might clearly
375. Id. at 106.
376. Id. Justice Harlan reasoned that if the Court were to determine that the Council’s action
was administrative in nature, then the Council would have usurped the authority of the district court.
Id. at 102.
377. Id. at 118–19.
378. United States v. Malmin, 272 F. 785 (3d Cir. 1921).
379. See id. at 792 (“[C]onfessedly this court has power to restore the orderly proceedings of the
trial court by commanding the absent judge to return and transact its business.”).
380. Id. at 787–88.
381. Id. at 792.
382. Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 120–21 (Harlan, J., concurring).
383. Id. at 126.
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recognize the Council’s failure to assert a strong quantum of evidence that
he had been slow to rule on cases or that a backlog of trials existed.
Like Justice Harlan, Justice Douglas chastised the majority for not
considering the constitutional questions raised by the Council’s actions.384
While it was true that the majority determined Judge Chandler had
“acquiesced” to the Council’s February 4 Order, the Council had clearly
concluded that there was an ongoing controversy between Judge Chandler
and itself by continuing the March 27 Order.385 Like the majority,
Justice Douglas did not note that the Legislative Branch had already taken
cognizance of the in-fighting between Judge Chandler and
Judge Murrah.386 Instead, Justice Douglas reminded his fellow Justices that
in 1941, in Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner,387 the Court found
efforts by courts of appeals to expedite cases through the district courts
through the establishment of rules governing en banc hearings to be
characterized as functions that are inherently judicial, rather than
administrative.388 To Justice Douglas, the Council’s February 4 Order to
Judge Chandler did not erase the impact of its March 27 Order because
Judge Chandler remained disqualified from serving on new cases and
remained under the stigma of the March 27 Order.389
Justice Douglas then turned to the constitutional implications in the
majority’s decision. “An independent judiciary is one of this Nation’s
outstanding characteristics. Once a federal judge is confirmed by the Senate
and takes his oath, he is independent of every other judge[,]”
Justice Douglas argued.390 “He commonly works with other federal judges
who are likewise sovereign. But neither one alone nor any number banded
together can act as censor and place sanctions on him.”391 Justice Douglas
tried to remind the majority that only Congress could determine whether a
judge had the qualifications or proper conduct for continued judicial
384. Cf. id. at 132–33 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting Judge Chandler’s central argument was
that it was “illegal for the Council to deprive him of new cases”).
385. See id. at 90 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“In light of this continued challenge to the order, the
Solicitor General in March 1966 agreed ‘that the case can no longer be deemed moot.’”).
386. See generally id. 129–42 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (omitting legislative notice of an altercation
between Judge Chandler and Judge Murrah).
387. Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Comm’r, 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
388. Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 134–35 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Textile Mills, 314 U.S.
at 326).
389. Id. at 135.
390. Id. at 136.
391. Id.
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service.392 Additionally, he noted the Supreme Court lacked the authority
to censor or discipline any federal judge.393 The dangers inherent in the
Council’s actions, he concluded, “may have profound consequences” in that
they enable any of the councils to ensure a particular district court judge is
foreclosed from sitting on “a racial case, church-and-state case, [or] a free
press case . . . .”394 Had Justice Douglas ended on this note, his argument
might have appeared to be a pure constitutional disagreement between the
dissent and the Burger-led majority. However, Justice Douglas turned to a
list of his complaints about judicial administration.
Oddly, Justice Douglas’s primary anger appears to have been directed at
the actions of the Judicial Conference of the United States—the statutorily
created “administrative function” consisting of the chief justices of the
circuit courts, the chief justice of the Supreme Court, and occasionally chief
judges of the district courts.395 Today, among its myriad of duties, the
Judicial Conference is responsible for studying the performance of the
courts in order to promote judicial efficiency, but it can also conduct
investigations, and it has subpoena authority.396 Moreover, as previously
noted, the Conference annually reports to Congress on its proceedings.397
Perhaps in response to the Senate investigation into Justice Fortas and his
eventual resignation in May 1969, the Conference issued a resolution which
authorized the judicial councils to pass judgment as to whether a judge could
serve as the executor of a will or teach at a law school.398 Justice Douglas
pointed out that none of these constraints on judges were constitutional
until, perhaps, Congress enacted new rules, but such judicially imposed
constraints (Justice Douglas labelled them judicial “hazing”) suggested they
could likewise be used to intimidate judges and encroach on their
independence.399 Justice Douglas concluded: “It is time we put an end to
392. Id.
393. See id. at 136–37 (emphasizing no federal judge nor a group of federal judges may sanction
another federal judge).
394. Id.
395. Id. at 136–39; see also Judicial Code of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, ch. 646, § 331, 62 Stat.
902, 902 (proposing the parties attend the Judicial Conference).
396. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2012).
397. Id.
398. See Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 137–38 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“On June 10, 1969, the Judicial
Conference adopted resolutions for the governance of many activities of circuit judges and district
judges.”); see also Taft’s Statement on Justice Fortas’ Resignation, supra note 233 (referencing charges
against Justice Fortas that ultimately led to his resignation in May of 1969).
399. Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 140–41.
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the monstrous practices that seem about to overtake us, by vacating the
orders of the Judicial Council that brand Judge Chandler as unfit to sit in
oncoming cases.”400 Although Justice Black joined in Justice Douglas’
dissent, he also separately dissented, and accused the majority of “break[ing]
faith with [the] grand constitutional principle” of an independent
judiciary.401
IV. THE USE OF CHANDLER
For almost a decade after Chandler II, neither the judicial nor legislative
branches acted to clarify the extent to which the judicial councils could
administratively supervise district court judges, or for that matter, the judges
on the courts of appeals. In 1973, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in
In re Imperial “400” National Inc.,402 addressed its own Judicial Council’s
authority to promulgate rules through a tortuous examination of the
relationship between the Council and a district court.403 One year earlier,
the Judicial Council for the Third Circuit issued a rule preventing a lawyer
from representing a trustee if the lawyer’s firm had also submitted a
bankruptcy plan or overseen a bankruptcy proceeding involving the
trustee.404 The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
upheld the rule after an attorney challenged that its application created a
forced severance of an existing attorney-client relationship.405 While the
rule may have been important, the fact that the Third Circuit ultimately sat
in judgment of its own rule—or that a district court found that the Council’s
rule was lawful—should have raised a question as to whether the right to an
independent and impartial appellate review existed in this situation. The
appellate court determined, however, that it was not sitting in judgment of

400. Id. at 141.
401. Id. at 142 (Black, J., dissenting). It should be noted that Justice Douglas joined
Justice Black in this separate dissent. Id. at 141.
402. In re Imperial “400” Nat’l, Inc., 481 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1973).
403. Id. at 45–46.
404. Id. at 42.
405. Id. However, it should be noted that in Nolan v. Judicial Council of the Third Circuit, the Judicial
Council advanced the argument of the district court that, the district court did not possess jurisdiction
to examine its rule on the basis that “no case or controversy” arose as a result of its implementation.
346 F. Supp. 500, 511 (D. N.J. 1972), aff’d, In re Imperial “400” Nat’l, Inc., 481 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1973).
Nolan was the predecessor decision to Imperial. See Imperial, 481 F.2d 41, 42 (3d Cir. 1973) (“On May 2,
1972[,] the district court, pursuant to this resolution, removed appellant, Joseph M. Nolan, Esq., as
counsel[.]”).
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itself, rather, it determined that it sat in judgment of the lower court.406
Although the aggrieved party sought certiorari, the Supreme Court never
granted review.407
One legal scholar commented that the majority in Chandler II
“sidestepped [the] core issue” in front of the Court.408 As evidenced by In
re Imperial, this is a charitable description of what the majority accomplished
in Chandler II, for its legacy in one significant area—the lack of a formal
standard of proof to assess any judicial discipline—created an unintended
means for diminishing judicial independence.409 This is not to argue that
there is the same lack of standards in the present time as there was in 1970,
or that Judge Chandler’s conduct would be acceptable under present
standards. Concededly, since Chandler II’s issuance, one might believe that
both Congress and the courts have brought greater clarity and discernable
standards to judicial regulation. Nonetheless, there remain dangers to
judicial independence that the Court could have solved in 1970.
A. Legislative Responses to Chandler
In 1980, and in response to Chandler II, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C § 372,
an act referred to as the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and
Disability Act.410 This Act empowered the judicial councils to determine
when a judge is encumbered by a disability.411 It was also enacted to
provide greater public transparency to the adjudication of complaints
against judges.412 Today, the Act essentially enables a judicial council to
find that if a judge is unable to function due to physical or mental disability,
the president may appoint another judge (subject to Senate confirmation),
406. Imperial, 481 F.2d at 42.
407. Judicial Council of the Third Circuit v. Nolan, 414 U.S. 880 (1973) (mem.).
408. Dana A. Remus, The Institutional Politics of Federal Judicial Conduct Regulation, 31 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 33, 41 (2012).
409. See, e.g., Imperial, 481 F.2d at 42 (“The circuit council, while composed of judges, is an
administrative body, and not a court.”).
410. Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (codified as 28 U.S.C § 372 (2012)). See also United States v. Washington,
98 F.3d 1159, 1165 (9th Cir. 1966) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (acknowledging Chandler
was the impetus for the 1980 Act).
411. Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, § 3(a)(6),
94 Stat. at 2037.
412. Cf. Anthony J. Scirica, Judicial Governance and Judicial Independence, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 779, 792
(2015) (discussing a different bill founded upon questions of “the judiciary’s ability to self-regulate[,]”
where speakers at its hearing argued the bill would “strengthen judicial independence and give the
public ‘greater faith’ in the judiciary”).
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preventing the disabled judge from serving on cases.413 This Act was part
of an update to both 28 U.S.C. §§ 331 and 332.414 The federal courts have
interpreted the 1980 Act as empowering the judicial councils to internally
investigate the conduct of district court judges, which includes equating a
lack of “judicial temperament” to an inability to perform judicial duties.415
In 1980, Judge Gerhard Gesell of the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia noted that the 1980 Act, unlike the 1939 Act
establishing the judicial councils, was an express statutory grant of authority
to the Judicial Branch “to put its own house in order.”416
Another significant addition to judicial governance and the authority of
the judicial councils was enacted in 2002.417 Now, when an aggrieved
person or party files a complaint against a judge, the chief judge on the court
of appeals determines whether the complaint is frivolous or should be

413. 28 U.S.C § 372(b) (2012).
414. Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, § 3(a), 94 Stat.
at 2035, 2038–39.
415. See, e.g., McBryde v. Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct, 83 F. Supp. 2d 135, 140
(D. D.C. 1999) (“The conduct targeted by the Act ranges from such intangibles as a lack of ‘judicial
temperament’ to patterns of abusive behavior that threatens to undermine the integrity of the judiciary
as a whole, as well as behavior symptomatic of an underlying disease.”), aff’d in part and vacated in part,
McBryde v. Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct, 264 F.2d 52 (D.C. Cir. 2001). This decision
originated within the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in which the Judicial Council for that
circuit determined that Judge John J. McBryde of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas had engaged in “conduct prejudicial to the effective administration of the business
of the courts.” Id. at 139. The Council reprimanded Judge McBryde and disqualified him from hearing
new cases for a one year period. Id. He was also prohibited from hearing cases with certain attorneys
for a three-year period. Id. When Judge McBryde challenged the decision, the District Court for the
District of Columbia was appointed to determine the appeal. Id. at 135. The District Court in this
decision alleged that McBryde had adopted Justice Douglas’s dissent in his arguments that only
Congress could discipline him in this manner. Id. at 154, 156. The difference, however, between
Chandler II and McBryde, is that by the time of McBryde’s appeal, Congress had authorized the Council
to act as it had. See id. at 156 (recognizing a group of judges may act “in an administrative capacity to
investigate and remedy ‘conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the
business of the courts’” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1))); Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct
and Disability Act of 1980, § 3(c), 94 Stat. at 2040 (authorizing, in 1980, judicial councils to act as they
did in McBryde); Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 142 (warning of “a blatant effort on the part of the Council . . .
to make Judge Chandler a ‘second-class judge,’ depriving him of the full power of his office[,]” and
stressing a lack of authority, both in the Constitution and in statutes, authorizing judges to appropriate
such authority ).
416. Hastings v. Judicial Conference of U.S., 593 F. Supp. 1371, 1374 (D. D.C. 1984), aff’d in
part and vacated in part, Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the U.S., 770 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
417. Judicial Improvements Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1848 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 351–64 (2012)).
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investigated.418 Informal investigations that result in counseling do not
require a council’s intervention.419 If a chief judge determines that no
formal investigation is necessary, neither the complaining party nor the
judge has standing to challenge this determination in court.420 However, if
the chief judge determines that an investigation is necessary, she or he may
refer the matter to a judicial council that, in turn, can decide by a majority
vote whether to investigate the complaint by the appointment of five
judges.421
One improvement since Chandler II is that there is now a minimum
requirement that two district court judges must serve on an investigation
panel—in the event that the subject of the complaint is a district court
judge.422 The chief judge may also convene an investigation panel
composed of the chief judge, and an equal number of district court and
circuit court judges.423 In the event the chief judge forms such an
investigation panel, the panel may only make recommendations to the
circuit’s judicial council.424 A judicial council, in turn, determines whether
418. 28 U.S.C. § 352(b) (2012).
419. Id. § 352(a).
420. Id. § 352(c). This section reads:
A complainant or judge aggrieved by a final order of the chief judge under this section may
petition the judicial council of the circuit for review thereof. The denial of a petition for review
of the chief judge’s order shall be final and conclusive and shall not be judicially reviewable on
appeal or otherwise.
Id.
421. Id. § 352(d). “Each judicial council may, pursuant to rules prescribed under section 358,
refer a petition for review filed under subsection (c) to a panel of no fewer than [five] members of the
council, at least [two] of whom shall be district judges.” Id.
422. Id.
423. Id. § 353(a). Specifically, section 353(a) reads:
Appointment.—If the chief judge does not enter an order under section 352(b), the chief judge
shall promptly—
(1) appoint himself or herself and equal numbers of circuit and district judges of the circuit to a
special committee to investigate the facts and allegations contained in the complaint;
(2) certify the complaint and any other documents pertaining thereto to each member of such
committee; and
(3) provide written notice to the complainant and the judge whose conduct is the subject of the
complaint of the action taken under this subsection.
Id.
424. Id. § 353(c). Section 353(c) explains that a committee conducting an investigation must
execute such investigation as thorough as necessary. Id. The committee is required to “file a

2017]

The Right to an Independent Judiciary

151

to dismiss the complaint, investigate further, or “take such action as is
appropriate to assure the effective and expeditious administration of the
business of the courts within the circuit.”425 A judicial council has the
authority to prevent the assignment of new cases to a trial judge, as well as
the authority to privately or publicly reprimand or censure the judge.426
However, any order prohibiting the assignment of new cases to a judge must
have a defined termination date.427 The Judicial Conference is the only
level of review to which a judge is entitled when challenging a council’s
disciplinary decision.428 The Conference may recommend impeachment to
Congress, adopt the judicial council’s determination, or make a separate
Again, such determinations are not judicially
determination.429
reviewable.430
While Congress has provided a right of notice for investigated judges,
there is no right for an amicus brief to be filed on behalf of a judge, and
there is an absence of a standard of proof required to justify any quantum
of discipline against a judge.431 Instead, Congress left to the judicial
comprehensive written report . . . with the judicial council of the circuit.” Id. “Such report shall present
both the findings of the investigation and the committee’s recommendations for necessary and
appropriate action by the judicial council of the circuit.” Id.
425. Id. § 354(a)(1)(C).
426. Id. § 354(a)(2)(A).
427. Id. § 354(a)(2)(A)(i).
428. See id. § 355 (allowing investigated judges to seek an independent review of a judicial
council’s determination by the Judicial Conference); see also id. § 357 (setting forth the restriction for
judicial review). Particularly, section 357(a) states: “A complainant or judge aggrieved by an action of
the judicial council under section 354 may petition the Judicial Conference of the United States for
review thereof.” Id. 357(a). This section allows the Judicial Conference, or a standing committee, to
grant or deny filed petitions. Id. 357(b).
429. Id. § 355(b).
430. Id. § 357(c) (refusing judicial review of final decision).
431. In particular, section 358(b) requires rules promulgated under subsection (a) to include
terms requiring:
(1) adequate prior notice of any investigation be given in writing to the judge whose conduct is
the subject of a complaint under this chapter;
(2) the judge whose conduct is the subject of a complaint under this chapter be afforded an
opportunity to appear (in person or by counsel) at proceedings conducted by the investigating
panel, to present oral and documentary evidence, to compel the attendance of witnesses or the
production of documents, to cross-examine witnesses, and to present argument orally or in
writing; and
(3) the complainant be afforded an opportunity to appear at proceedings conducted by the
investigating panel, if the panel concludes that the complainant could offer substantial
information.
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councils and the Judicial Conference the authority to prescribe rules for the
conduct of their own proceedings.432 While Congress adhered to the
separation of powers principles in enacting these procedures, the lack of a
continuous legal standard of proof remains a deficiency for both the rights
of an individual judge as well as a potential source to undermine the
independence of trial judges. Chandler II should have served as a warning to
cure this deficiency.
B. Judicial Use of Chandler
It is true that in the past two decades the judicial councils have addressed
allegations of judicial misconduct far more transparently and appropriately
than when the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit examined
Judge Chandler in 1965. For instance, in 2010, the Judicial Council for the
Ninth Circuit held that the judicial councils are not the appropriate vehicle
for reviewing a judge’s decision not to recuse himself or herself when
accused of bias.433 But transparency has not been true in all matters.
In 2005, the Judicial Council for the Second Circuit admonished a judge
who—during a 2004 American Constitutional Law Society meeting—
analogized the Supreme Court’s Bush v. Gore434 decision to the 1922
installation of Benito Mussolini as Italian Prime Minister by King Victor
Emmanuel III, and encouraged the audience not to vote for George W.
Bush.435 The Judicial Council for the Second Circuit did not inform the
public that the subject of the investigation was Judge Guido Calabresi, even
though it found that Judge Calabresi had violated a prohibition within the
judicial ethics canons.436 On the other hand, in 2014, the Judicial
Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability determined that
the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council’s reprimand of Judge Richard F. Cebull
(of the United States District Court for the District of Montana) was
meritorious as it was based on the fact that Judge Cebull had sent racist

Id. § 358(b). Section 359(b) reads: “No person shall be granted the right to intervene or to appear as
amicus curiae in any proceeding before a judicial council or the Judicial Conference under this chapter.”
Id. § 359(b).
432. Id. § 358(b).
433. In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 605 F.3d 1060, 1061 (9th Cir. 2010).
434. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
435. In re Charges of Judicial Misconduct, 404 F.3d 688, 700 (2d Cir. Jud. Council 2005).
436. Id.
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e-mails regarding President Barack Obama.437 The difference between
Judge Calabresi and Judge Cebull is that Judge Cebull expressly waived
confidentiality.438
In 2008, the Judicial Conference promulgated rules governing
investigations by judicial councils.439 The rules took effect following a
committee headed by Justice Steven Breyer, and were drafted to compliment
the 1980 Judicial Conduct and Disability Act.440 Once a complaint against
a judge is forwarded to the chief judge of a court of appeals, the chief judge
must determine whether there is “clear and convincing evidence” of
misconduct, and if so, whether to forward the complaint for a formal
investigation.441 This is the only step in which a legal standard exists.442
As a result, the federal judiciary has not adequately addressed Chandler II’s
key deficiency, that is, the lack of a clear legal standard for determining
judicial misconduct throughout the entire process, as well as standards for
the chosen remedies.
Since its issuance, Chandler II has been cited over one hundred times—
generally for the proposition that appellate judges serving in their council
capacity possess supervisory authority over lower court judges.443 As an
example, in In re Certain Complaints Under Investigation,444 the Court of

437. See In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 751 F.3d 611, 613 (Jud. Conf. U.S. 2014)
(finding the investigation was warranted based on an email sent from a judicial account making
race-related remark about President Obama and his mother after “this incident became public through
media reports”).
438. Compare id. at 614 (expressly waiving confidentiality), with Charges of Judicial Misconduct,
404 F.3d at 700 (failing to expressly waive confidentiality).
439. RULES FOR JUD. CONDUCT, supra note 118. See generally Arthur D. Hellman, When Judges
Are Accused: An Initial Look at the New Federal Judicial Misconduct Rules, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 325, 325–29 (2008) (“This article examines the newly adopted misconduct rules against
the background of these recent controversies and the concerns they have generated in Congress . . . .”).
440. Scirica, supra note 412, at 787.
441. GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY vol. 2, pt. E, ch. 3, art. II, r. 5 (JUD. CONF. U.S. 2015),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/guide-vol02e-ch03.pdf [perma.cc/9DTK-B8MZ].
442. See generally id. at vol. 2, pt. E, ch. 3 (promulgating the “clear and convincing” standard—
and only the “clear and convincing” standard).
443. See, e.g., In re Certain Complaints Under Investigation, 783 F.2d 1488, 1505
(11th Cir. Jud. Council 1986) (“The majority in Chandler [II] indicated that there was no constitutional
obstacle to the broadly worded grant of authority to judicial councils . . . .”), superseded by statute, Judicial
Discipline & Removal Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5124 (1990) (codified as
28 U.S.C § 332(d)(2) (2012)).
444. In re Certain Complaints Under Investigation, 783 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. Jud. Council 1986),
superseded by statute, Judicial Discipline & Removal Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat.
5124 (1990) (codified as 28 U.S.C § 332(d)(2) (2012)).
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Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit noted that the Burger Court had
recognized that some “management power” existed in the judicial councils,
but the appellate court also correctly discerned that the Chandler II majority
never determined whether the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit had
exceeded its authority.445 The Eleventh Circuit also opined that Justice
Douglas and Justice Black had viewed United States District Courts as
“mere collections of individual judges, each of whom is a complete law unto
himself or herself.”446 Neither Justice Douglas nor Justice Black
propounded this theory—but it does seem to be the appellate court’s
interpretation of their dissents.447 The In re Certain Complaints case arose
from United States District Court Judge Alcee Hastings’s challenge to a
judicial investigation of his conduct.448 This investigation was organized
pursuant to the 1980 statutory addition to the original act which enabled the
councils to investigate the conduct of lower court judges.449 As a result,
Chandler II had only indirect applicability to the issue before the Eleventh
Circuit, but one might still find the characterization of the dissent troubling.
Not only is the “complete law unto himself or herself” absent from Justice
Douglas’ dissent, but at no time did Justice Douglas or Justice Black suggest
that case assignment schemes from district court chief judges were
unconstitutional, or that judicial discipline could only originate with
Congress.450
In 2015, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed a United
States district court judge’s refusal to permit a Massachusetts-based
Assistant United States Attorney to prosecute a trial in Nevada against Bank
of America unless the United States Attorney for the District of Nevada
certified that no assistant federal prosecutors employed in the Nevada office

445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Compare Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 129–43 (“Once a federal judge is confirmed by the Senate
and takes his oath, he is independent of every other judge. He commonly works with other federal
judges who are likewise sovereign. But neither one alone nor any number banded together can act as
censor and place sanctions on him.”), with Certain Complaints, 783 F.2d at 1505 (“We read Chandler as
rejecting any fixed notion . . . that courts are mere collections of individual judges, each of whom is a
complete law unto himself or herself. Two of the justices who participated in Chandler, Justices Douglas
and Black, did indeed take this view, but in dissent.”).
448. Certain Complaints, 783 F.2d at 1491.
449. Id.
450. Id. at 1505; see generally Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 129–43 (expressing a view different from
that extended by the Certain Complaints opinion).
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were capable of prosecuting the case.451 Apparently, the district court
judge, Robert Clive Jones, had instituted a policy preventing pro hac vice
attorneys from appearing in his court.452 The majority of the appellate
court found that, because Jones had reversed his order after the United
States filed a writ of mandamus, and that the error of denying pro hac vice
appearances would likely not be repeated, they were not required to grant
the writ.453 However, Judge John Clifford Wallace, in his concurrence,
cited to Chandler II for the proposition that the Judicial Council for the
Ninth Circuit possessed the authority to require the district court to permit
federal prosecutors to appear in the district court as a matter of ensuring
court efficiency, and that formal mandamus writs were a misuse of the
Court’s time.454 It would be reasonable to believe that Judge Wallace’s
interpretation of Chandler II’s applicability to a council’s administrative
authority over a district court judge’s rule making is a sound analysis.
Moreover, the influence of the Court’s handling of Chandler II reached
beyond the United States. On July 13, 1965, Lucien Cardin (the Minister of
Justice and Attorney General of Canada) asked Ivan Cleveland Rand (a
retired Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada) to lead an inquiry into the
conduct of Justice Leo Landreville, a judge on the Ontario Supreme
Court.455 Like Judge Chandler, Justice Landreville had been accused of
improper fiscal and business relationships.456 In Justice Landreville’s case,
he was accused of accepting monies from the Northern Ontario Natural
Gas Corporation.457 Up until this point, no Canadian judge had ever faced
impeachment, and retired Justice Rand decided to quietly ascertain methods
451. In re United States, 791 F.3d 945, 949–50 (9th Cir. 2015).
452. Id. at 950.
453. Id. at 951.
454. Id. at 961 (Wallace, J., concurring) (citing Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 86 n.7).
455. See S.A. Scott, Editor’s Diary, The Search for an Amending Process 1960–1967, 12 MCGILL L.J.
337, 361, 367 (1966–1967) (asserting Lucien Cardin became “Minister of Justice and Attorney-General
for Canada” on July 7, 1965, and that he retired April 4, 1967); PRIVY COUNCIL, INQUIRY RE: THE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE LEO A. LANDREVILLE 1 (1966) [hereinafter PRIVY COUNCIL, INQUIRY
RE: LANDREVILLE], available at http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2016/bcp-pco/Z11966-2-eng.pdf [perma.cc/D3C9-YXDK] (“[O]n the recommendation of the Minister of Justice,
advise that the Honourable Ivan Cleveland Rand, of Moncton, in the Province of New Brunswick, be
appointed Commissioner under Part I of the Inquiries Act to inquire into the dealings of the
Honourable Mr. Justice Leo A. Landreville . . . .”).
456. See PRIVY COUNCIL, INQUIRY RE: LANDREVILLE, supra note 455, at 1, 3 (pointing out
Landreville’s relationship with Ralph K. Farris).
457. See id. (“[C]ircumstances revolving around the acquisition of 7,5000 shares of NONG for
which he paid no consideration.”).
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of judicial discipline in the United States.458 He was given the name and
address of Warren Olney III (Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts) for assistance.459 The retired Justice Rand’s effort to
seek out information beyond and outside of the Court’s Chandler II opinion
illustrates a vital concern for the decision’s potential to undermine judicial
independence extending beyond the United States.
V. CONCLUSION
It is doubtful that Chief Justice Burger and the Court’s majority intended
for Chandler II to permit an encroachment into the independence of trial
judges by appellate judges under the guise of supervision—there is nothing
in the decision’s text to suggest this was the case. Although this Article has
necessarily focused on the federal judiciary, there is more than a minor
anecdotal indicium in the state courts that Chandler II can be interpreted as
permitting such an encroachment. In Halverson v. Hardcastle,460 the Nevada
Supreme Court, relying on Chandler II, determined that the chief trial judge’s
administrative oversight of a trial judge could include aspects of judicial
punishment in regard to the judge’s performance, even though the state
legislature had not acted against the judge.461
But not all state appellate courts have mirrored the Nevada court. In
1992, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court (describing its functions which are
equivalent to the judicial councils in investigating allegations of judicial
malfeasance) noted that the burden of proof by clear and convincing
evidence rests with the accusation’s proponent and not the subject judge—
throughout the entirety of the investigatory proceedings—and then quoted

458. See Letter to Ivan C. Rand, Former Justice, Canadian Supreme Court (Mar. 1, 1966) (on
file with the Nat’l Archives of Can.) (suggesting Rand inquired into the names and addresses of U.S.
officials who might be in a position to help with the mechanics of reviewing judicial conduct).
459. See id. (listing Director Olney as a contact).
460. Halverson v. Hardcastle, 163 P.3d 428 (Nev. 2007).
461. Id. at 444–45; see also In re Mussman, 289 A.2d 403, 404–05 (N.H. 1972) (announcing the
authority to investigate a state trial judge and to remove that judge from further hearings when
warranted, but dismissing the action because it had not yet ripened). In this decision, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court determined that it possessed the authority to investigate the conduct of a
state trial judge as well as remove him from hearing further cases, but then decided the issue was not
ripe. Id. The trial judge in question was facing a disbarment proceeding by the state board of
professional responsibility and the state supreme court sensibly, in the author’s view, decided to wait
to investigate so as not to prejudice a separate investigation, particularly since the trial judge had been
removed from pending trials. Id.
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Justice Black’s dissent as a warning against encroachment into judicial
independence.462
Thus, one state’s judiciary has utilized Chandler II as a means for senior
judges or judicial bodies to discipline a judge without regard to the state
legislature, and another state has cautioned against Chandler II’s use to this
effect. In doing so, the second state impliedly pointed out Chandler II’s key
deficiency that remains to this day—the lack of a defined burden of proof
on the councils and Conference in investigating and assessing judicial
misconduct.
As a decision which stands for the proposition that the judiciary should
have the administrative rule-making authority or the ability for a council to
“referee” disputes between judges, Chandler II does present a reasonable
citation. On the other hand, Chief Justice Burger’s disregard of the recent
legal and political history underlying Judge Chandler’s appeals led the
majority to issuing a rash decision that opened the possibility of
encroachments into judicial independence by administrative bodies and
higher courts, and, in turn, which could undermine a litigant’s confidence in
an independent and impartial judiciary. While there may be no need for a
complete denunciation of Chandler II, the judiciary should recognize a
remaining danger to judicial independence created by the flawed decision,
and should limit the use of that decision to purely administrative issues,
rather than legal issues.

462. See In re Larsen, 616 A.2d 529, 534 (Pa. 1992) (“The hope for an independent judiciary will
prove to have been no more than an evanescent dream.” (quoting Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 143 (Black, J.,
dissenting))).

